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WASHINGTON — Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated seven leading members of a Russian intelligence-linked malign influence group for their role in the government of the Russian Federation’s destabilization campaign and continued malign influence campaigns in Moldova. An entity owned or controlled by one of these individuals has also been designated.

“The sanctions imposed today shine a light on Russia’s ongoing covert efforts to destabilize democratic nations,” said Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Brian E. Nelson. “Russia’s attempted influence operations exploit the concerns of the citizens of these countries, to destabilize legitimately elected governments for Moscow’s own interests. The United States remains committed, along with the EU, to target individuals who engage in such activities against the government of Moldova.”

Today’s designations are part of an ongoing effort to combat Russia’s malign influence in Moldova. The U.S. government has previously exposed Russia’s attempts to use covert operatives to subvert democracy in Moldova. On October 26, 2022, OFAC sanctioned Yuriy Igorevich Gudilin, Olga Yurievna Grak, and Leonid Mikhailovich Gonin for their coordinated efforts in 2020 and 2021 to influence the outcome of Moldova’s elections. Additionally, on May 30, 2023, the EU sanctioned several Russian and Moldovan individuals for engaging in destabilizing activities against the government of Moldova. The U.S. government will continue to support the Moldovan government and people in their efforts to combat coercive activities that undermine democracy in Moldova.

 

A MALIGN INFLUENCE GROUP WITH A GLOBAL REACH

The malign influence actors OFAC designated today are part of a large global information operation connected to the Russian Federation that targets Ukraine, countries bordering Ukraine including Moldova, Balkan countries, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These actors provoked, trained, and oversaw groups in democratic countries that conduct anti-government protests, rallies, marches, and demonstrations. These malign influence operatives analyze countries vulnerable to exploitation and stoke fears that undermine faith in democratic principles in the targeted countries.

Several of the malign influence actors designated today maintain ties to Russian intelligence services regarding matters such as planning, staffing, and budgeting for the group’s activities.

 

EFFORTS TO DESTABILIZE THE GOVERNMENT OF MOLDOVA

Throughout February and March of 2023, several thousand demonstrators participated in multiple anti-government protests in the Moldovan capital of Chisinau, and other major cities in Moldova. The protests were organized by the fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor, whom OFAC previously designated in October 2022 pursuant to Executive Order (E.O) 14024 for being responsible for or complicit in, or for having directly or indirectly engaged or attempted to engage in interference in a United States or other foreign government election for or on behalf of, or for the benefit of, directly or indirectly, the government of the Russian Federation. The protestors called for the current president of Moldova, Maia Sandu, to resign. During the protests, Moldovan intelligence services and police forces maintained public order and conducted multiple raids, made arrests, and expelled foreign individuals carrying out subversive actions to destabilize the government of Moldova.

The Russian Federation-connected influence actors OFAC designated today were part of a plot to capitalize on these protests in Chisinau and seize the Moldovan Government House. As noted in the White House’s March 10, 2023 statement on Russia’s attempts to destabilize Moldova, this was an effort by Russia-connected malign influence actors to foment a manufactured insurrection against the Moldovan government. In February 2023, the group organized protest training, likely in support of a Moldova-focused destabilization plot. During the protests, members of the aforementioned malign influence group oversaw the movement of some personnel to locations in Moldova, including Chisinau. 

Training for the protest was directed by an instructor cadre with links to Mikhail Sergeyevich Potepkin. OFAC designated Potepkin on July 15, 2020, for his role as Regional Director for M Invest, a designated company that served as cover for Kremlin-backed PMC Wagner forces operating in Sudan, and was responsible for developing plans for former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir to suppress protestors. OFAC sanctioned Potepkin’s former employer, the Internet Research Agency, on September 30, 2019, for its efforts to influence the 2018 U.S. midterm elections.

Konstantin Prokopyevich Sapozhnikov, Yury Yuryevich Makolov, Gleb Maksimovich Khloponin, Svetlana Andreyevna Boyko, Aleksey Vyacheslavovich Losev, Vasily Viktorovich Gromovikov, and Anna Travnikova are all members of this Russia-connected malign influence group that is attempting to destabilize the government of Moldova. They are all being designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for being responsible for or complicit in, or for having directly or indirectly engaged or attempted to engage in, activities that undermine the peace, security, political stability, or territorial integrity of the United States, its allies, or its partners for or on behalf of, or for the benefit of, directly or indirectly, the government of the Russian Federation.

Konstantin Prokopyevich Sapozhnikov is the leader of the aforementioned malign influence group and organized the plot to destabilize the government of Moldova in early 2023.

Yury Yuryevich Makolov was involved in logistical support for the plot to destabilize the government of Moldova.

Gleb Maksimovich Khloponin was involved in gathering security details on various government buildings in Moldova for the plot to destabilize the government of Moldova.

Svetlana Andreyevna Boyko is a senior member of the aforementioned malign influence group and handled budgeting for the plot to destabilize the government of Moldova.

Aleksey Vyacheslavovich Losev (Losev) conducted reconnaissance in Moldova for the plot to destabilize the government of Moldova. Losev owns Perko Julleuchter, a workshop that produces ceramic lanterns. OFAC is designating Perko Julleuchter pursuant to E.O. 14024 for being owned or controlled by, or for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Losev.

Vasily Viktorovich Gromovikov was involved in the financing of the plot to destabilize the government of Moldova.

Anna Travnikova has been involved in the aforementioned malign influence group’s influence operations targeting foreign audiences. The operations were designed to sway public opinion abroad in favor of Russia in the context of Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine. In 2022, Travnikova coordinated with Boyko on promoting pro-Russia narratives for audiences in multiple countries, including the United States.

 

SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS

As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. All transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or blocked persons are prohibited unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or exempt. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.

The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, please refer to OFAC’s Frequently Asked Question 897 here. For detailed information on the process to submit a request for removal from an OFAC sanctions list, please click here.

For more information on the individuals and entity designated today, click here.

 

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WASHINGTON – Under Secretary of the Treasury Jay Shambaugh today met with the appointed Ambassador from the People’s Republic of China Xie Feng. The meeting was candid, constructive, and part of ongoing efforts to maintain open lines of communication and responsibly manage our bilateral relationship. While raising issues of concern, Under Secretary Shambaugh emphasized the importance of the two largest economies closely communicating on global macroeconomic and financial issues and working together on global challenges.

WASHINGTON —Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is designating the Iran-based technology company known as “Arvan Cloud,” two senior employees of Arvan Cloud, and an affiliated company based in the United Arab Emirates for their roles in facilitating the Iranian regime’s censorship of the Internet in Iran.

Arvan Cloud is a key partner of Iran’s Information and Communications Technology Ministry in the development of the National Information Network (NIN), a countrywide intranet that is being used to disconnect the Iranian people from the global Internet. Arvan Cloud has a close relationship with Iran’s intelligence services, including the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), and Arvan Cloud executives have extensive ties to senior Iranian government officials. The Iranian government has regularly used Internet restrictions and the throttling of Internet speeds to suppress dissent, surveil and punish Iranians for exercising their freedom of expression and assembly both online and offline, and limit the dissemination to the international community of credible information about egregious human rights violations.

“Free and unrestricted access to information is a fundamental right of all peoples, including in Iran,” said Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Brian E. Nelson. “The United States is committed to holding accountable those who seek to undermine freedom of expression and suppress dissent, and to call out regimes who deny their citizens this right.”

Today’s action is being taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13846, which authorizes sanctions on persons who engage in censorship or other activities with respect to Iran. In addition, OFAC is issuing a time-limited general license to allow the wind down of transactions with Arvan Cloud. Today’s action is consistent with the U.S. government’s continued support for the Iranian people’s ability to freely access information both offline and online such as through the provision of Internet communication tools to the people of Iran, including under Iran General License D-2. Please also see FAQs 1087 and 1088 for information about the provision of cloud services for the Iranian people.

Arvan Cloud

Navyan Abr Arvan Private Limited Company, known as Arvan Cloud, has played a prominent role in the Iranian government’s development of the NIN infrastructure, a censored version of the Internet under the control of Iranian authorities. The government has responded to the protests that began at the end of 2022 following the death of Mahsa Jina Amini, as well as previous rounds of protests, with significant Internet disruptions and restrictions, in addition to mobile network shutdowns and curfew-style disturbances. The Iranian regime has sought to move domestic Internet traffic to the NIN in an effort to mitigate the billions of dollars in lost economic activity it incurs when it imposes internet restrictions to suppress dissent. As a web-hosting service and content delivery network, Arvan Cloud has helped lay the groundwork for the NIN’s integrated cloud network infrastructure. In contracts with the Ministry of Information and Communications Technology (ICT), Arvan Cloud has explicitly agreed to provide interception for the government, allowing Iranian authorities to control and censor incoming and outgoing traffic and surveil data on the servers. Arvan Cloud has also blocked websites at the request of Iran’s Committee to Determine Instances of Criminal Content (CDICC), a government entity previously designated by the United States pursuant to E.O. 13628 for its role in monitoring online content and playing a major role in the filtering of websites deemed to be against the regime’s national beliefs and safety.

Arvan Cloud maintains a close relationship to Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), and senior managers of Arvan Cloud are either current or former affiliates of MOIS. Former MOIS officials have also publicly encouraged the use of Arvan Cloud services.

Arvan Cloud is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13846 for having engaged in censorship or other activities with respect to Iran on or after June 12, 2009, that prohibit, limit, or penalize the exercise of freedom of expression or assembly by citizens of Iran, or that limit access to print or broadcast media, including the facilitation or support of intentional frequency manipulation by the Government of Iran or an entity owned or controlled by the Government of Iran that would jam or restrict an international signal.

Pouya Pirhosseinloo (Pirhosseinloo) and Farhad Fatemi (Fatemi) are the co-founders of Arvan Cloud and serve as the CEO and the tech lead and senior site reliability engineer, respectively.

ArvanCloud Global Technologies L.L.C. is a Dubai-based affiliate of Arvan Cloud that provides cloud services on behalf of Arvan Cloud and provides a bridge for Arvan Cloud’s connection to the global internet. Arvan Cloud senior executives and employees, including Pirhosseinloo and Fatemi, manage, maintain, and act as administrative points of contact for ArvanCloud Global Technologies L.L.C’s domain and IP addresses.

Pirhosseinloo and Fatemi are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13846 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Arvan Cloud.  Arvancloud Global Technologies L.L.C is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13846 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Arvan Cloud.

SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS

As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of these persons that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons must be blocked and reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. OFAC regulations generally prohibit all dealings by U.S. persons or within the United States (including transactions transiting the United States) that involve any property or interests in property of blocked or designated persons.

In addition, persons that engage in certain transactions with the persons designated today may themselves be exposed to sanctions or subject to an enforcement action. Furthermore, unless an exception applies, any foreign financial institution that knowingly facilitates a significant transaction or provides significant financial services for any of the persons designated today could be subject to U.S. sanctions.

The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, please refer to OFAC’s Frequently Asked Question 897.

Click here for identifying information on the individuals designated today.

 

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WASHINGTON – Today, Secretary Yellen met with Ajay Banga at the Treasury Department ahead of his taking office as World Bank President on Friday. During their engagement, Secretary Yellen warmly welcomed Banga’s upcoming presidency and conveyed her strong desire for Treasury to continue close collaboration with Banga in building on the strong progress made so far on evolving multilateral development banks (MDBs). That includes continuing implementation of the recommendations of the G20 Capital Adequacy Framework review to get the most out of the Bank’s balance sheet, and improving and increasing the amount of private capital mobilized for our shared global development objectives and to refine the operating model to increase the responsiveness and agility of the bank. Secretary Yellen also reiterated the importance of the World Bank working more closely with its sister development banks. Secretary Yellen stressed the need to support the poorest of the Bank’s member countries as they continue to face multiple crises, including continuing global macroeconomic headwinds exacerbated by Russia’s war in Ukraine. Secretary Yellen underscored that she looks forward to having Banga’s experienced leadership and proven management skills at the helm of this critical multilateral institution during a period of significant global challenge and opportunity.

WASHINGTON- Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen issued the following statement after Congress passage of the Fiscal Responsibility Act.  

“I am pleased that, under President Biden’s leadership, Congress has passed bipartisan legislation to suspend the debt limit and prevent a first-ever default by the United States. This legislation protects the full faith and credit of the United States and preserves our financial leadership, which is critical to our economic growth and stability.

A default would have caused severe hardship for American families, potentially leading to the loss of millions of jobs and trillions in household wealth, and higher financing costs for American taxpayers for years to come. The bipartisan agreement also protects against efforts to roll back the President’s core economic agenda – one that has contributed to a historically strong and resilient economic recovery. Congress has a duty to ensure that the United States can pay its bills on time, and I continue to strongly believe that the full faith and credit of the United States must never be used as a bargaining chip.

Now, our focus is to continue to deliver on the President’s economic agenda. Treasury will continue to effectively implement the Inflation Reduction Act, including the modernization of the IRS, to maximize economic benefits for American taxpayers, families, and workers.”
 

WASHINGTON — Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated four companies generating revenue from, and contributing to, the conflict in Sudan. The entities designated today are affiliated with the two embattled forces that are fueling the ongoing conflict in Sudan: two companies affiliated with the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and two companies affiliated with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).

“Through sanctions, we are cutting off key financial flows to both the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces, depriving them of resources needed to pay soldiers, rearm, resupply, and wage war in Sudan,” said Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen. “The United States stands on the side of civilians against those who perpetuate violence towards the people of Sudan.”

 

Entities Associated with the RSF

AL JUNAID MULTI ACTIVITIES CO LTD

Al Junaid Multi Activities Co Ltd is a Sudanese holding company controlled by RSF Commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo and his brother, RSF Deputy Commander Abdul Rahim Dagalo. Based in Khartoum, Al Junaid operates 11 subsidiaries across multiple economic sectors, including the gold mining industry. Since the RSF’s expropriation of the Jebel Amer gold mine in 2017, gold mining and export has become a vital source of revenue for the Dagalo family and the RSF. 

OFAC designated Al Junaid Multi Activities Co Ltd pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14098 for being responsible for, or complicit in, or having directly or indirectly engaged or attempted to engage in actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Sudan.

 

TRADIVE GENERAL TRADING L.L.C.

 Tradive General Trading L.L.C. is a front company controlled by RSF Major Algoney Hamdan Dagalo. Based in the UAE, Tradive General Trading L.L.C. is a procurement company that has purchased vehicles for the RSF in the past. Some of these vehicles may have been retrofitted with machine guns for the RSF to use to patrol the streets of Khartoum and elsewhere in Sudan.

Tradive General Trading L.L.C. was designated pursuant to E.O. 14098 for being responsible for, or complicit in, or having directly or indirectly engaged or attempted to engage in actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Sudan.

 

Entities Associated with the SAF

DEFENSE INDUSTRIES SYSTEM

 Defense Industries System is Sudan’s largest defense enterprise, generating an estimated $2 billion in revenue via hundreds of subsidiaries across various sectors of Sudan’s economy. DIS manufactures a range of small arms, conventional weapons, ammunition, and military vehicles for the SAF, and uses a complex system to hide its ownership of these subsidiaries and to obtain favorable letters of credit from the Sudan Central Bank. Defense Industries System not only defaults on the loans obtained under these letters of credit but also uses these favorable funds guarantees to compete unfairly with civilian businesses that do not enjoy such favorable financial terms. In addition, between the opaque ownership structure of its subsidiaries and certain tax exemptions, Defense Industries System contributes little, if anything, to Sudan’s revenues.

OFAC designated Defense Industries System pursuant to E.O. 14098 for being responsible for, or complicit in, or having directly or indirectly engaged or attempted to engage in actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Sudan.

 

SUDAN MASTER TECHNOLOGY

Sudan Master Technology (SMT), an arms company, is a shareholder in multiple Defense Industries System companies and a major shareholder in three companies involved producing weapons and vehicles for the SAF.

OFAC designated Sudan Master Technology pursuant to E.O. 14098 for being responsible for, or complicit in, or having directly or indirectly engaged or attempted to engage in actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Sudan.

 

GENERAL LICENSES

Consistent with the humanitarian exceptions to sanctions outlined in United Nations Security Council Resolution 2664 and implemented by the U.S. in December 2022, recommendations from Treasury’s 2021 Sanctions Review, and OFAC’s policy of supporting the basic needs of vulnerable populations while continuing to deny resources to malign actors, OFAC is issuing three general licenses (GLs) concurrent with today’s action.

These GLs authorize certain activities of international organizations and nongovernmental organizations and certain transactions relating to the provision of water, food, and agricultural and medical items to Sudan. They are designed to ensure that humanitarian assistance and related trade reaches Sudanese civilians through legitimate and transparent channels, while simultaneously maintaining the effective use of targeted sanctions against those contributing to the situation in Sudan. 

 

SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS

As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of these persons that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all dealings by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons.

Recognizing the importance of allowing certain transactions that can benefit the Sudanese people, concurrent with today’s action OFAC is issuing general licenses to authorize certain activities of international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and persons engaged in particular transactions relating to water and agricultural and medical items, that would otherwise be prohibited under E.O. 14098.

The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from its ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from OFAC’s willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, please refer to OFAC’s Frequently Asked Question 897. For detailed information on the process to submit a request for removal from an OFAC sanctions list, please click here.

For more information on the persons designated today, click here.

 

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WASHINGTON — Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is designating members and affiliates of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its external operations arm, the IRGC-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), who have participated in a series of terrorist plots including assassination plots targeting former United States government officials, dual U.S. and Iranian nationals, and Iranian dissidents. This action targets three Iran- and Türkiye-based individuals and a company affiliated with the IRGC-QF, along with two senior officials of the IRGC’s Intelligence Organization (IRGC-IO), who have been involved in plotting external lethal operations against civilians including journalists and activists.    

“The United States remains focused on disrupting plots by the IRGC and its Qods Force, both of which have engaged in numerous assassination attempts and other acts of violence and intimidation against those they deem enemies of the Iranian regime,” said Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Brian E. Nelson. “We will continue to expose and disrupt these terrorist activities and efforts to silence opposing voices, particularly those who advocate for respect for the universal human rights and freedoms of the Iranian people.”

Today’s actions are being taken pursuant to the counterterrorism sanctions authority Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended. Treasury has consistently acted to address external terrorist plotting by the IRGC-QF and Iran’s intelligence service, notably: the October 2011 designation of senior IRGC-QF officials involved in an Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States; the December 2020 designation of an individual involved in the IRGC-QF’s efforts to plan and execute operations in the Middle East and the United States; and the September 2021 designation of Iranian intelligence operatives who targeted a U.S. citizen in the United States and Iranian dissidents in other countries as part of a wide-ranging campaign to silence critics of the Iranian government.

IRGC-QF Operatives

IRGC-QF official Mohammad Reza Ansari (Ansari), a longtime member of the group, has supported the IRGC-QF’s operations in Syria. Ansari is a member of an IRGC-QF external operations unit tasked with undertaking covert operations abroad, including planning and conducting intelligence and lethal operations against Iranian dissidents and other non-Iranian nationals  in the United States, the Middle East, Europe, and Africa. Ansari, with the support of Shahram Poursafi (Poursafi), an Iranian national, planned and attempted to assassinate two former U.S. government officials. The Department of Justice indicted Poursafi  on August 10, 2022, for providing and attempting to provide material support to a transnational murder plot. Poursafi has also been involved in IRGC-QF operational planning and surveillance operations in the Caucasus region. 

Mohammad Reza Ansari and Shahram Poursafi are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having acted for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the IRGC-QF.

Hossein Hafez Amini (Amini), a dual Iranian and Turkish national based in Türkiye, is an associate of the IRGC-QF operating as part of a network in Türkiye. Amini uses his connections in the aviation industry and his Türkiye-based airline, Rey Havacilik Ithalat Ihracat Sanayi Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi (Rey Airlines), to assist the IRGC-QF’s covert operations, including kidnapping and assassination plots targeting Iranian regime dissidents in Türkiye. Additionally, Amini has leveraged his Türkiye-based network to support the IRGC-QF through aircraft charters and smuggling operations. Amini and Rey Airlines also previously transferred aircraft to Iran’s Pouya Air, an IRGC-affiliated Iranian airline designated since March 2012 pursuant to E.O. 13224 for acting for or on behalf of the IRGC-QF. 

Hossein Hafez Amini is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the IRGC-QF. Rey Airlines is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, directly or indirectly, Hossein Hafez Amini. 

IRGC’s Intelligence Organization

Since its inception in 2009, the IRGC-IO has established itself as a domestic and international unit focused on targeting journalists, activists, dual Iranian nationals, and others who oppose the abuses and human rights violations perpetrated by the Iranian regime. Former IRGC-IO Counterespionage Department Chief Rouhallah Bazghandi (Bazghandi) has been involved in planning and overseeing IRGC-IO operations in Iraq and Syria as well as lethal operations against Israeli nationals. Bazghandi has also been involved in plots to assassinate journalists and Israeli nationals in Istanbul. 

The IRGC-IO Foreign Intelligence Chief Reza Seraj (Seraj) has been involved in failed IRGC-IO operations in Asia and in intelligence operations targeting U.S. citizens. Seraj previously led the IRGC-IO Special Operations Division, which is focused on special activity against Israel, where he was responsible for a series of failed operations targeting Israeli nationals. 

Rouhallah Bazghandi and Reza Seraj are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having acted for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the IRGC. 

The IRGC-IO and Bazghandi were also designated on April 27, 2023, pursuant to E.O. 14078, “Bolstering Efforts to Bring Hostages and Wrongfully Detained U.S. Nationals Home,” marking the first use of this authority, which reaffirms the fundamental commitment of the U.S. Government to bring home those U.S. nationals held hostage and wrongfully detained abroad. 

Sanctions Implications

As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the individuals and entities named above, and of any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by them, individually, or with other blocked persons, that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons, must be blocked and reported to OFAC. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC or otherwise exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within the United States (including transactions transiting the United States) that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons. The prohibitions include the making or receiving of any contribution of funds, goods, or services to or for the benefit of those persons.

Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions with the individuals and entities designated today entails risk of secondary sanctions pursuant to certain authorities, including E.O. 13224, as amended. Pursuant to E.O. 13224, OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on the opening or maintaining in the United States of a correspondent account or a payable-through account of a foreign financial institution that has knowingly conducted or facilitated any significant transaction on behalf of a Specially Designated Global Terrorist.

The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from their ability to designate and add persons to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) List, but also from OFAC’s willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with U.S. law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, please refer to OFAC’s Frequently Asked Question 897, here. For detailed information on the process to submit a request for removal from an OFAC sanctions list, please see this link.

Click here for identifying information on the individuals and entity designated today.

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WASHINGTON – Today, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen met virtually with French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire. Secretary Yellen conveyed her appreciation of France’s leadership in convening the Summit for a New Global Financial Pact in Paris. Secretary Yellen also raised the U.S priorities for the Paris Summit, including continuing the momentum to evolve multilateral development banks (MDBs) and increasing private capital mobilization to achieve development goals and address global challenges like climate change. 

As Prepared for Delivery

Good morning, Chairman Brown, Ranking Member Scott, and Members of the Committee.

Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today about this important national security issue. 

At the Department of the Treasury, we understand the significant challenge China poses to the economic and national security interest of the United States. I manage the government’s review of foreign investment into the United States for national security risks through the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).  In this work we are focused on stopping the access and exploitation of sensitive technologies, infrastructure, data and other assets by those who have the intent and capability to harm our national security. 

Recently, Secretary Yellen addressed the U.S.-China economic relationship. In her remarks, she conveyed that China and the United States can and need to find a way to live together and share in global prosperity. She also stressed the importance of our countries working together, when possible, for the benefit of us and the world. 

At the same time, Secretary Yellen was crystal clear when it comes to national security: The United States will secure our national security interests and those of our allies and partners. We remain firm in our conviction to defend our values. We will not hesitate to defend our vital interests. And we will not compromise on national security concerns—even when they force trade-offs with our economic interests.  She also made clear: we do not use our national security tools to gain competitive economic advantage or to stop China from growing.  But we will fully and zealously exercise our economic tools to protect the national security of the United States, full stop.

CFIUS is one important tool to address national security that pursues these objectives. The Committee—comprised of the heads of several Executive Branch agencies and which I help lead in support of the Secretary of the Treasury’s role as Chair—carefully reviews foreign investments in the United States for national security risks. When necessary, the Committee takes action to address any such risks while seeking to maintain an open investment environment and the status of the United States as one of the world’s top destinations for foreign direct investment.

CFIUS protects national security in the context of foreign direct investment from any country. By law, the Committee analyzes the facts and circumstances of each transaction on a case-by-case basis following a rigorous review process that leverages subject-matter expertise across the Executive Branch. Our risk analysis is focused on three factors: the threat emanating from the foreign investor, the national security vulnerabilities presented by the U.S. business, and the consequence of a transaction to national security. When we identify a risk, our mandate is to resolve it, whether by mitigating the risk through enforceable restrictions on the parties or, as a last resort, by recommending the President block or unwind a transaction.

Over the years, as national security threat environment has evolved, so has CFIUS. First established by executive order in 1975, the Committee has benefited from congressional action to codify and enhance its authorities. Most recently, Congress did so with the bipartisan Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, or FIRRMA. Among other things, FIRRMA provided the Committee with important authorities over certain investment structures that had previously fallen outside its jurisdiction and modernized our processes to better enable timely and effective reviews of covered transactions. It also provided the Committee with much needed jurisdiction over certain transactions involving real estate in close proximity to sensitive facilities.

Treasury has dedicated significant time and resources to the successful implementation of FIRRMA and the efficient processing of what is now an all-time high caseload. Prior to enactment, the Committee processed 237 filings in 2017. Four years later, our case load nearly doubled to 436 filings in 2021. We expect the number of cases to continue at this heightened level.

Since I was confirmed to my role as Assistant Secretary for Investment Security, I have been focused on making sure CFIUS operates effectively and efficiently, bringing to bear all available resources and tools to support our important national security mission. This effort includes the issuance of the first Executive Order since the Committee was established to provide formal Presidential direction on additional risks that we are to consider when reviewing a covered transaction. It also includes the issuance of our first ever enforcement and penalty guidelines to ensure that transaction parties are held accountable for failing to comply with our laws or for not upholding their obligations to mitigate national security risk. While Congress rightly put in place strict confidentiality for information filed with CFIUS, we have and will continue to take enforcement actions on specific matters to protect national security.  We are also enhancing our tactics and techniques to ensure we are gathering more detailed information about foreign acquirers and deal structures to thoroughly assess the national security risks arising in any given transaction. 

When CFIUS reviews a transaction that raises national security concerns, the Committee can mitigate the risk by requiring that certain measures be undertaken, and these measures are formalized in what we call a National Security Agreement, or mitigation agreement. When we negotiate a mitigation agreement, our work does not stop after the agreement is signed.

We routinely conduct site visits, collect documents and information, and engage with third party monitors and auditors to ensure that the terms of these agreements are upheld and parties live up to their compliance obligations. While preventing violations from occurring is our primary focus, the availability of robust remediation and enforcement tools in the event of non-compliance is necessary because a breach could harm national security. Under the Defense Production Act, the Committee has its own enforcement authority—including subpoena authority—and can impose monetary penalties and seek other remedies for violations of its statute, regulations, mitigation orders, conditions, or agreements. We will not hesitate to take enforcement action when necessary to protect national security.

We also continue to enhance our ability to identify non-notified transactions and engage with international partners and allies. Indeed, the Committee actively monitors investment activity and follows up on tips from the public and other sources to identify these types of transactions that may pose national security risk. Should we identify a potentially covered transaction that may raise national security concerns, we request the parties file a notice, and initiate our formal review process. We have also established a process to assist partners and allies with foreign investment review—including the sharing of threat information—while contributing to the establishment and modernization of over 20 international foreign direct investment screening mechanisms.

Finally, as we protect national security in the context of inbound investments, we continue to contribute to interagency discussions regarding policies to restrict certain U.S. outbound investments in specific sensitive technologies with significant national security implications. Our desire is to avoid situations in which U.S. investments support and advance technologies that enhance military or intelligence capabilities in countries of concern that could undermine our national security and put Americans at risk.

While we are proud of the Committee’s efforts, our work remains unfinished, and there are always ways to improve. We remain focused on being as effective as we can be in our national security mission. You have my commitment that we will use all authorities available to us to protect the national security of the United States.

In the end, as we work to counter the national security risks that emanate from China, as Secretary Yellen has said, where possible we need to find a way to work together for the benefit of the world, but in doing so we never compromise our national security.  Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today, I look forward to answering any questions you may have.