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140,803 Taxpayers Filed Their Taxes Directly with the IRS for Free as users claimed more than $90 million in refunds and saved an estimated $5.6 million in tax preparation fees

 

WASHINGTON – Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury and Internal Revenue Service (IRS) announced key data on the performance of the IRS’s Direct File Pilot showing that the program surpassed the Treasury’s goal of 100,000 users, received positive user ratings, and saved taxpayers money. The Direct File pilot program was made possible by President Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act and allowed taxpayers in 12 states with simple taxes to file for free, directly with the IRS.

The IRS designed the pilot to follow best practices for launching a new technology platform – start small, make sure it works, then build from there. After successful testing, Direct File opened to broader access mid-way through the filing season. Even so, 140,803 taxpayers successfully filed returns using Direct File, with users reporting a high degree of user satisfaction. Direct File users claimed more than $90 million in refunds and saved an estimated $5.6 million in tax preparation fees on their federal returns alone. The 12 states that participated in this year’s pilot either had no state income tax or a free state filing tool similar to Direct File. Usage was robust in both categories of states.

“The IRS’s Direct File pilot enabled more than 140,000 taxpayers to file their taxes for free, saving participants time and money,” said Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Wally Adeyemo. “Thanks to President Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act, the IRS created a program that helped taxpayers access $90 million in refunds, achieved top notch customer service ratings and provided the data and lessons necessary to determine next steps.” 

The IRS also collected information on user experiences with Direct File. In a GSA Touchpoints survey of more than 11,000 Direct File users, 90% of respondents ranked their experience with Direct File as “Excellent” or “Above Average.” Direct File received a Net Promoter Score (NPS) of +74, an exceptionally high rating.

Direct File also allowed the IRS to test a large-scale live-chat feature. Direct File customer service representatives (CSRs) handled tens of thousands of chats with an average wait time of one minute and an Average Handle Time of 9 minutes. 90 percent of survey respondents who used Customer Support rated their experience as excellent or above average.

A majority of survey respondents who filed taxes in the prior year reported having to pay to prepare their taxes last year. Among survey respondents, 47 percent of users paid to file their taxes last year and 16 percent did not file last year at all. 

Foundational technology and product development costs for the IRS were $10.5 million, and Direct File’s operational costs – including customer service, cloud computing and user authentication – were just $2.4 million. To build and run the pilot, the IRS also engaged the U.S. Digital Service (USDS) and costs associated with their work are not included.

The Treasury and IRS will continue to analyze results of the pilot before deciding on the future of Direct File in the coming weeks.

 

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WASHINGTON — Today, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is sanctioning over one dozen entities, individuals, and vessels that have played a central role in facilitating and financing the clandestine sale of Iranian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), which itself is involved in supporting Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Russia’s war in Ukraine. Sahara Thunder is the main front company that oversees MODAFL’s commercial activities in support of these efforts. Sahara Thunder also plays a key role in Iran’s design, development, manufacture, and sale of thousands of UAVs, many of them ultimately transferred to Russia for use in its war of aggression against Ukraine. OFAC is also sanctioning two companies and a vessel involved in the shipment of Iranian commodities for Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars, which similarly plays a leading role in the commercial activities of Iran’s Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS). Concurrent with this action, the United Kingdom and Canada are imposing sanctions targeting several entities and individuals involved in Iran’s UAV procurement and other military-related activities.

“Iran’s Ministry of Defense continues to destabilize the region and world with its support to Russia’s war in Ukraine, unprecedented attack on Israel, and proliferation of UAVs and other dangerous military hardware to terrorist proxies,” said Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Brian E. Nelson. “The United States, in close coordination with our British and Canadian partners, will continue to use all means available to combat those who would finance Iran’s destabilizing activities.” 

Today’s action is being taken pursuant to the counterterrorism authority in Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended, E.O. 13382, a counterproliferation authority, and E.O. 14024, which targets Russia’s harmful foreign activities. OFAC designated MODAFL pursuant to E.O. 13224 on March 26, 2019 for assisting, sponsoring, or providing financial, material, or technological support for, or financial or other services to or in support of, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF). The IRGC-QF was designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 on October 25, 2007 for providing support to multiple terrorist groups. The Department of State designated MODAFL pursuant to E.O. 13382 and E.O. 14024 on October 25, 2007 and February 23, 2024, respectively.

SAHARA THUNDER

The Iranian government allocates billions of dollars’ worth of commodities to Iranian military entities including MODAFL and the AFGS as part of the Iranian military’s annual budget. Sahara Thunder, which is subordinate to MODAFL, oversees MODAFL’s commercial activities. In November 2023, OFAC sanctioned the network of Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars Company (Sepehr Energy), which plays a similar role leading the sale of Iranian commodities on behalf of the AFGS.

Sahara Thunder has also played an instrumental role in the Iranian military’s sale of UAVs. MODAFL has cooperated with Russia to finance and produce Iranian-designed one-way attack UAVs at the U.S.-sanctioned Joint Stock Company Special Economic Zone of Industrial Production Alabuga (SEZ Alabuga) facility in Russia under a $1.75 billion contract. As of late 2022, Russian officials were negotiating a deal for Sahara Thunder to deliver and produce thousands of UAVs per year at this facility. Such UAVs have been used by the Russian military in Ukraine against critical infrastructure and civilian targets. 

U.S.-sanctioned Generation Trading FZE has been used as part of this network to receive millions of dollars’ worth of payments from SEZ Alabuga and its subsidiaries as part of Russia’s contract with MODAFL.

Generation Trading FZE was designated on February 23, 2024 pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, MODAFL. SEZ Alabuga was designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 on February 23, 2024, for operating or having operated in the defense and related materiel sector of the Russian Federation economy. 

Sahara Thunder is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, MODAFL. Sahara Thunder is also being designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating in the defense and related materiel sector of the Russian Federation economy.

SAHARA THUNDER’S LEADERSHIP

Kazem Mirzai Kondori (Kondori), Hossein Bakshayesh (Bakshayesh), and Hojat Abdulahi Fard (Abdulahi Fard) are officials of Sahara Thunder. Bakhshayesh has been the managing director of Sahara Thunder, while Abdulahi Fard has served as a board member at Sahara Thunder and a representative of Iranian company Etemad Tejarat Misagh, which is also a subsidiary of MODAFL.

Kondori and Bakshayesh are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Sahara Thunder. Abdulahi Fard is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being a leader or official of Sahara Thunder.

Kondori, Bakshayesh and Abdulahi Fard are also being designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for being a leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of Sahara Thunder. Etemad Tejarat Misagh is being designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, MODAFL. 

SAHARA THUNDER’S GLOBAL SHIPPING NETWORK

Iranian military entity Sahara Thunder relies on a vast shipping network involved in the sale and shipment of Iranian commodities on behalf of MODAFL to multiple jurisdictions including the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Russia, and Venezuela. Sahara Thunder has entered into time-charter contracts with India-based Zen Shipping & Port India Private Limited for the Cook Islands-flagged vessel CHEM (IMO 9240914), which is managed and operated by UAE-based Safe Seas Ship Management FZE. Sahara Thunder has used the CHEM to conduct multiple shipments of commodities since 2022. Iran-based Arsang Safe Trading Co. has provided ship management services in support of several Sahara Thunder-related shipments, including those by the CHEM.

Safe Seas Ship Management FZE also manages and operates the Palau-flagged DANCY DYNAMIC (9158161), Cook Islands-flagged K M A (9234616), and Cook Islands-flagged CONRAD (9546722), all of which have been used to ship Iranian commodities. 

Iran-based Asia Marine Crown Agency has served as the port agent in Bandar Abbas, Iran supporting several Sahara Thunder shipments. India-based Sea Art Ship Management (OPC) Private Limited and UAE-based company Trans Gulf Agency LLC have worked together to provide ship management services in support of Sahara Thunder. UAE and Iran-based Coral Trading EST. has purchased Iranian commodities from Sahara Thunder.

Zen Shipping & Port India Private Limited, Safe Seas Ship Management FZE, Arsang Safe Trading Co., Asia Marine Crown Agency, Coral Trading EST., and Sea Art Ship Management (OPC) Private Limited are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Sahara Thunder. Trans Gulf Agency LLC is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Sea Art Ship Management (OPC) Private Limited.

The CHEM, DANCY DYNAMIC, K M A, and CONRAD are being identified as property in which Safe Seas Ship Management FZE has an interest.

SEPEHR ENERGY SHIPMENT

Onden General Trading FZE is a UAE-based broker which sold Iranian commodities on Sepehr Energy’s behalf to be delivered off shore near Singapore. Sepehr Energy’s shipment, valued at several tens of millions of dollars, was loaded in the Persian Gulf aboard a vessel disguising itself as a different vessel. The vessel LA PEARL (9174660), also known as the ELITE, received the cargo via a ship-to-ship transfer from another vessel in mid-April in international waters near Singapore. Panama-based Saone Shipping Corporation is the operator and owner of the LA PEARL.

Onden General Trading FZE and Saone Shipping Corporation are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars Company. The LA PEARL is being identified as property in which Saone Shipping Corporation has an interest.

POUYA AIR

Iranian cargo airline Pouya Air was designated on March 27, 2012 pursuant to E.O. 13224 for acting for or on behalf of the IRGC-QF to transport illicit cargo, including weapons, to Iran’s proxies in the Middle East. Pouya Air is being re-designated under E.O. 13382 for its transshipment of Iranian military UAVs to Russia. Pouya Air’s Ilyushin-76 aircraft EP-PUS has transported UAVs and UAV-related cargo from Iran to Russia on behalf of the IRGC Aerospace Force. Some of the UAVs and UAV-related cargo was intended for the SEZ Alabuga.

Pouya Air is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, the IRGC Aerospace Force. EP-PUS is being identified as property in which Pouya Air has an interest. The IRGC Aerospace Force was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 on June 16, 2010. 

UAV PROCUREMENT AND DEVELOPMENT 

Bonyan Danesh Shargh Private Company (Bonyan Danesh Shargh) is an Iran-based company that produces UAVs, quadcopters, engines, and electronic and digital parts. The company engages in a wide range of business activities and operates in the public and private sectors in Iran and abroad. Bonyan Danesh Shargh has served as an intermediary for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization (IRGC ASF SSJO) in its business dealings. Bonyan Danesh Shargh has been involved in the IRGC ASF SSJO discussions regarding the Alabuga UAV facility in Russia. 

The IRGC ASF SSJO is involved in Iranian ballistic missile research and development and manages Iran’s production of Shahed-series UAVs. The Department of State designated the IRGC ASF SSJO pursuant to E.O. 13382 on July 18, 2017 for engaging, or attempting to engage, in activities or transactions that have materially contributed to, or pose a risk of materially contributing to, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery. Bonyan Danesh Shargh is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, the IRGC ASF SSJO.

BONYAN DANESH SHARGH LEADERSHIP AND BUSINESS NETWORK

Abbas Abdi Asjerd (Asjerd) has served as Chief Executive Officer of Bonyan Danesh Shargh where Seyed Mohsen Vahabzadeh Moghadam (Moghadam) and Zahra Abdi Asjerd (Zahra) have served in different official capacities.  Hamid Eidi Ashjerdi (Eidi) has provided corporate auditing and inspection services to Bonyan Danesh Shargh.

Asjerd, Moghadam, and U.S.-designated IRGC ASF SSJO Chief Abdollah Mehrabi (Mehrabi) serve in different official capacities at the Iran-based firm Baran Sazan Caspian Anzali Free Zone Company (BSC). Asjerd and Moghadam are also board members of the Iran-based firms Sanaye Motorsazi Alvand Private Company (Alvand) and Pishro Sanat Aseman Sharif Private Company (Pishro Sanat). Alvand manufactures, imports, and exports UAVs and engines. Pishro Sanat designs and manufactures sensitive UAV components, including servomotors. Mohammad Ali Moradipour (Moradipour) has provided corporate auditing and inspection services to Alvand.

Mehrabi was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 on October 29, 2021 for acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the IRGC ASF SSJO.

Asjerd, Moghadam, and Zahra are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Bonyan Danesh Shargh. BSC, Alvand, and Pishro Sanat are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for being owned or controlled by, directly or indirectly, Asjerd. Eidi is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, Bonyan Danesh Shargh. Moradipour is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, Alvand.

SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS

As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons. 

In addition, financial institutions and other persons that engage in certain transactions or activities with the sanctioned entities and individuals may expose themselves to sanctions or be subject to an enforcement action. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. 

The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, please refer to OFAC’s Frequently Asked Question 897 here. For detailed information on the process to submit a request for removal from an OFAC sanctions list, please click here.

Click here for more information on the individuals and entities designated today.

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New Inflation Reduction Act Provision Broadens Access and Boosts Return on Clean Energy Tax Credits

Washington, D.C. — As part of the Biden-Harris Administration’s Investing in America agenda, the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) today released final rules on transferability, a key Inflation Reduction Act provision that is already expanding the availability of capital to advance the U.S. clean energy transition. Transferability is helping projects get built more quickly and affordably, which will create good-paying jobs and lower energy costs for families. 

The Inflation Reduction Act created two new credit delivery mechanisms—elective pay (otherwise known as “direct pay”) and transferability—that are enabling state, local, and Tribal governments; non-profit organizations; Puerto Rico and other U.S. territories; and many more businesses to take advantage of clean energy tax credits. Until the Inflation Reduction Act introduced these new credit delivery mechanisms, governments, many types of tax-exempt organizations, and many businesses could not fully benefit from tax credits like those that incentivize clean energy construction. 

“The Inflation Reduction Act’s new tools to access clean energy tax credits are a catalyst for meeting President Biden’s historic economic and climate goals. They are acting as a force multiplier, enabling companies to realize far greater value from incentives to deploy new clean power and manufacture clean energy components,” said Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen. “More clean energy projects are being built quickly and affordably, and more communities are benefitting from the growth of the clean energy economy.”

“Thanks to President Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act, more small businesses, startups, and other businesses can now benefit from game-changing clean energy tax credits by using the innovative transferability tool,” said White House National Economic Advisor Lael Brainard. “We are already seeing businesses eager to participate in the transfer market, with more than 50,000 registration numbers requested for projects or facilities pursuing transferability. These final rules will provide additional clarity and certainty for clean energy investments in communities across the country.”

The Inflation Reduction Act’s transferability provisions allow businesses to transfer all or a portion of any of 11 clean energy credits to a third-party in exchange for tax-free immediate funds, so that businesses can take advantage of tax incentives if they do not have sufficient tax liability to fully utilize the credits themselves. Entities without sufficient tax liability were previously unable to realize the full value of credits, which raised costs and created challenges for financing projects.

The Inflation Reduction Act also allows tax-exempt and governmental entities to receive elective payments for 12 clean energy tax credits, including the major Investment and Production Tax Credits, as well as tax credits for electric vehicles and charging stations. Businesses can also choose elective pay for a five-year period for three of those credits: the credits for Advanced Manufacturing (45X), Carbon Oxide Sequestration (45Q), and Clean Hydrogen (45V).  Final rules on elective pay were issued in March.

To facilitate taxpayers transferring a clean energy credit or receiving a direct payment of an energy credit or CHIPS credit, the IRS built IRS Energy Credits Online (ECO) for taxpayers to complete the pre-file registration process and receive a registration number. The registration number must be included on the taxpayer’s annual return when making a transfer election or elective payment election for a clean energy credit. The registration process helps prevent improper payments to fraudulent actors and provides the IRS with basic information to ensure that any taxpayer that qualifies for these credit monetization mechanisms can readily access these benefits upon filing a return and making an election.

As of April 19, more than 900 entities have requested approximately 59,000 registration numbers for projects or facilities located across all 50 states plus territories. Approximately 97% of these projects are pursuing transferability.  A wide variety of credits are being used, but the bulk transferability-related registrations are related to solar and wind projects using the investment or production tax credit.  In addition, more than 1,300 projects or facilities submitted are pursuing elective pay, including submissions from more than 75 state and local governments to register approximately 650 clean buses and vehicles through elective pay.   

The value of the tax credits for these projects is not determined during the pre-filing registration process and is instead determined after an entity files their tax return.  

The number of registration number requests described above does not include cases where an entity has not yet formally requested a registration number, including those who may have work saved in progress in IRS ECO. Registration numbers, which speed return processing and help prevent improper payments, are being issued on a rolling basis.  The IRS has already issued approximately 40,000 registration numbers.

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As Prepared for Delivery

Thank you all for coming together today for this important discussion. 

I am Brian Nelson, the U.S. Treasury’s Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, or ‘TFI’.  The offices I lead, which include the Office of Foreign Assets Control, known as OFAC, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, or OIA, the Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes, TFFC, the Treasury Executive Office for Asset Forfeiture, or TEOAF, and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, or FinCEN, are tasked with deploying our financial intelligence, expertise, and economic authorities to combat terrorist financing, money laundering, weapons proliferators, corrupt actors, and other national security threats.

I am in San Juan to meet with you, as well as my government counterparts, to discuss the full range of our shared priorities to combat illicit financial activities and implementing strong AML/CFT standards to regulate the financial sector.  

You are on the front lines of combatting financial crimes, so I hope this will be a frank and open discussion and exchange of perspectives on how we can collectively mitigate these threats.

In recent years, there has been significant progress enhancing supervision of Puerto Rican Financial Entities (PRFEs), but we assess that significant risks remain so I’d like to hear from you how the regulatory developments and outstanding risks in this sector affect Puerto Rico’s commercial banking sector.

In response to these risks, FinCEN Director Andrea Gacki was here in February and convened the first ever FinCEN Exchange in Puerto Rico.  

This FinCEN Exchange was dedicated to enhancing collaboration between federal law enforcement and federally chartered commercial banks in Puerto Rico.

FinCEN Exchanges are a critical form of a public-private partnership that bring together our law enforcement, national security agencies, and financial institution partners to engage in candid and open dialogue.

I look forward to discussing what insights the FinCEN Exchange has produced into illicit financial activity in Puerto Rico, and where there are opportunities to further advance this work.

Before we dive into that discussion, I’d like to highlight a couple priority areas of focus for us.  We are focused on countering narcotics trafficking from Puerto Rico to the mainland United States, as well as combatting fraud and public corruption.

I’d like to hear from you how you identify suspicious transactions associated with narcotics trafficking, fraud, corruption, and other financial crimes, and where we can enhance our partnership to combat these risks.

I recognize the progress achieved enhancing supervision of Puerto Rican Financial Entities (PRFEs) through implementation of the Gap Rule and amendments to Puerto Rico Law 273.

However, we also recognize that more needs to be done to bolster Puerto Rico’s financial sector from abuse by illicit actors.

We assess that supervisory gaps are still being exploited by drug traffickers, corrupt actors, sanctions evaders, and others to launder significant amounts of funds through the U.S. financial system.

I welcome your insights into how you as commercial banks are mitigating these threats, and how you are working with International Banking Entities and International Financial Entities to do the same. 

At the same time, Treasury is working to enhance transparency of our financial sector.  This includes implementation of the Corporate Transparency Act to launch FinCEN’s beneficial ownership registry, as well as increasing transparency in the U.S. real estate sector and investment advisors.

While these reform efforts are underway, we have identified a growing trend of cash transactions for real estate purchases in Puerto Rico which create concerns due to limited transparency and reporting. 

I look forward to discussing how Puerto Rico’s commercial banks assess and mitigate these risks.

We have also identified the limited transparency in Puerto Rico’s growing cooperitavas sector as a priority to enhance regulation, supervision, and cooperation to mitigate the significant threats this sector poses to the integrity of the U.S. financial system.

Combatting these threats requires close partnership with you on the front lines.  I am here today to identify how we can enhance our collective efforts to mitigate these risks.  

I look forward to discussing these priority issues further.

 

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WASHINGTON — The G7 Cyber Expert Group completed a cross-border coordination exercise on 17 April 2024. G7 authorities routinely exercise to ensure they can effectively coordinate and communicate their response in the event of a widespread cyber incident affecting the financial system.

The primary objective of the exercise was to strengthen the ability of G7 financial authorities in effectively communicating and coordinating their respective responses to facilitate crisis management in the event of a significant cross-border cyber incident affecting the financial sector. The exercise built on previous simulations and workshops, which focused on cyber incident response, recovery management, and crisis communication. 

“This exercise is another critical opportunity for us to work with our G7 partners in our ongoing effort to combat cyberattacks,” commented Deputy Secretary Wally Adeyemo. “These simulations help strengthen the global financial system by ensuring that G7 countries are able to effectively coordinate and respond in the event of a crisis.”  

To optimize coordination among G7 financial authorities, the exercise assumed a large-scale cyber attack on financial market infrastructures and entities in all G7 jurisdictions. The exercise brought together 23 financial authorities, including ministries of finance, central banks, bank supervisors, and market authorities, as well as private industry participants.

By conducting such exercises, the G7 Cyber Expert Group aims to bolster the financial sector’s resilience and minimise disruptions across all G7 jurisdictions. This exercise allows the G7 financial authorities to continue to integrate the multiple lines of effort necessary to respond effectively to an incident. 

In an ever-changing and interconnected world, cross-border coordination, incident response preparedness, and information exchanges remain G7 priorities. The G7 Cyber Expert Group continuously collaborates on cybersecurity and stands ready to respond to cyber threats posed to the financial system. 

About the G7 Cyber Expert Group  

The G7 Cyber Expert Group coordinates cybersecurity policy and strategy across the G7 jurisdictions. The G7 Cyber Expert Group seeks to improve the cyber resiliency of the financial sector through preparedness, a consensus of the threat landscape, and a shared approach to mitigating risk and to this end has published various sets of Fundamental Elements, e.g. G7 Fundamental Elements of Ransomware Resilience for the Financial Sector and G7 Fundamental Elements for Third Party Cyber Risk Management in the Financial Sector. More information about the G7 Cyber Expert Group and publications can be found here.

 

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WASHINGTON — Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned two companies and four individuals involved in malicious cyber activity on behalf of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Cyber Electronic Command (IRGC-CEC). These actors targeted more than a dozen U.S. companies and government entities through cyber operations, including spear phishing and malware attacks. In conjunction with today’s action, the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation is unsealing an indictment against the four individuals for their roles in cyber activity targeting U.S. entities. 

“Iranian malicious cyber actors continue to target U.S. companies and government entities in a coordinated, multi-pronged campaign intended to destabilize our critical infrastructure and cause harm to our citizens,” said Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Brian E. Nelson. “The United States will continue to leverage our whole-of-government approach to expose and disrupt these networks’ operations.”

Iranian cyber actors continue to target the United States using a wide range of malicious cyber activity, from conducting ransomware attacks against critical infrastructure to conducting spear phishing and other social engineering campaigns against individuals, companies, and government entities. The IRGC-CEC, one of the Iranian government organizations behind malicious cyber activity, works through a series of front companies to target the United States and several other countries. Although front company management and key personnel know their operations support the IRGC-CEC, much of the Iranian public is not aware that some companies in Iran, such as Mehrsam Andisheh Saz Nik, are used as front companies to support the IRGC-CEC. The Iranian public should be aware that the IRGC-CEC uses private companies and their employees to achieve illegal goals.

Today’s action is being taken pursuant to the counterterrorism authority Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended. OFAC designated the IRGC-CEC, also known as the IRGC Electronic Warfare and Cyber Defense Organization, pursuant to E.O. 13606 on January 12, 2018, for being owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, the IRGC, which itself was designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 on October 13, 2017. In February 2024, OFAC designated six IRGC-CEC officials in response to recent cyber operations in which IRGC-affiliated cyber actors manipulated programmable logic controllers, which impacted critical infrastructure systems, including in the United States. While these particular operations did not disrupt any critical services, unauthorized access to critical infrastructure systems can enable actions that harm the public and cause devasting humanitarian consequences.  

IRGC-CEC FRONT COMPANIES AND AFFILIATED CYBER ACTORS

Mehrsam Andisheh Saz Nik (MASN), formerly known as Mahak Rayan Afzar, is an IRGC-CEC front company that has supported malicious cyber activity conducted by the IRGC-CEC. The company has been associated with multiple Iranian advanced persistent threat (APT) groups, including Tortoiseshell. The company is also associated with other malicious cyber activity, including a multi-year campaign targeting over a dozen U.S. companies and government entities, including the Department of the Treasury. 

Alireza Shafie Nasab is an IRGC-CEC-affiliated cyber actor who was involved in the same multi-year cyber campaign targeting U.S. entities while employed by MASN’s predecessor, Mahak Rayan Afzar. 

Reza Kazemifar Rahman (Kazemifar), another IRGC-CEC cyber actor, has been involved in operational testing of malware intended to target job seekers with a focus on military veterans. Kazemifar, while employed by MASN’s predecessor, Mahak Rayan Afzar, was also involved in the spear phishing campaign targeting multiple U.S. entities, including the Department of the Treasury. 

IRGC-CEC front company Dadeh Afzar Arman (DAA) has also engaged in malicious cyber campaigns on behalf of the IRGC-CEC. 

Hosein Mohammad Haruni was employed by DAA and has been associated with various spear phishing and other social engineering operations, in addition to malicious cyber activity targeting U.S. entities and the Department of the Treasury. 

Komeil Baradaran Salmani has been associated with multiple IRGC-CEC front companies and involved in spear phishing campaigns targeting multiple U.S. entities, including Department of the Treasury. 

Mehrsam Andisheh Saz Nik, Dadeh Afzar Arman, Alireza Shafie Nasab, Komeil Baradaran Salmani, and Reza Kazemifar Rahman are all being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the IRGC-CEC. Hosein Mohammad Haruni is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Dadeh Afzar Arman. 

SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS

As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons. 

In addition, financial institutions and other persons that engage in certain transactions or activities with the sanctioned entities and individuals may expose themselves to sanctions or be subject to an enforcement action. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. 

The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, please refer to OFAC’s Frequently Asked Question 897 here. For detailed information on the process to submit a request for removal from an OFAC sanctions list, please click here.

Click here for more information on the individuals and entities designated today.

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Sanctions Target the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin Terrorist Group

WASHINGTON — Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned two leaders of al-Qa’ida-aligned terrorist group Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) for hostage-taking of U.S. persons in West Africa. OFAC is designating these individuals pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14078, “Bolstering Efforts To Bring Hostages and Wrongfully Detained United States Nationals Home,” which targets those involved in, hostage-taking of a U.S. national or the wrongful detention of a U.S. national abroad. The Department of State concurrently designated five JNIM leaders pursuant to E.O. 14078, and designated two of these, as well as two additional leaders of JNIM, pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended. 

“JNIM relies on hostage-taking and wrongful detention of civilians in order to gain leverage and instill fear, creating anguish and misery for the victims and their families,” said Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Brian E. Nelson. “Treasury will continue to use all tools at our disposal to hold accountable those who seek to hold our citizens hostage.”

E.O. 14078 draws on the authority of the 2020 Robert Levinson Hostage Recovery and Hostage Taking Accountability Act. This act represents the determination of the Levinson family and other families of those taken hostage or who are wrongfully detained overseas, who have worked to turn their family’s extraordinary hardships into contructive and meaningful action.

The individuals designated today are members of Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an al-Qa’ida-aligned terrorist group operating in northwestern Africa. The Department of State designated JNIM as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) on September 6, 2018. Treasury has previously targeted JNIM in 2019, designating Bah Ag Moussa, a close associate of JNIM leader Iyad ag Ghali, pursuant to E.O. 13224; Bah Ag Moussa has led terrorist attacks in Mali, including one that killed 21 Malian soldiers.

Sidan ag Hitta (Hitta) is a Mali-based senior JNIM leader who was the JNIM official coordinating all negotiations regarding the release of western hostages and issued instructions concerning the hostages held by JNIM. On August 6, 2021, the Department of State designated Hitta pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being a leader of JNIM.

Jafar Dicko (Dicko) is a JNIM leader in Burkina Faso who was believed to have supervised the detention of a U.S. national. Dicko also served as a leader of Ansarul Islam, the JNIM-affiliated group responsible for kidnapping a U.S. national. On February 20, 2018, the Department of State designated Ansarul Islam pursuant to E.O. 13224.

Sidan Ag Hitta and Jafar Dicko are being designated for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, an act of hostage-taking of a U.S. national or wrongful detention of a U.S. national abroad.

SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS

As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons. 

The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, please refer to OFAC’s Frequently Asked Question 897 here. For detailed information on the process to submit a request for removal from an OFAC sanctions list, please click here.

Click here for more information on the individuals designated today.

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