Statement by Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen on Passage of Additional Economic Assistance for Ukraine

WASHINGTON — Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen issued the following statement on passage of the Continuing Appropriations and Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2023:

 

“With Congress’s vote today, the Biden-Harris Administration reaffirms our support for Ukraine with an additional $4.5 billion in economic assistance, bringing total direct budget support from the United States to $13 billion—all in grants. This new grant assistance is a further demonstration of U.S. confidence in Ukraine, and will support critical government operations and provide relief to Ukrainian people suffering under Russia’s brutal war. Critically, this funding will also help bolster Ukraine’s valiant resistance to Putin’s illegal war of aggression. We call on fellow donors to not only speed up their existing disbursements to Ukraine, but also to increase their scale of assistance. Alongside our critical economic support to the government and people of Ukraine, the Department of the Treasury will continue to use all available tools to hold Russian authorities responsible for their illegal actions in Ukraine, including through our historic sanctions coalition.”

 

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Treasury Imposes Swift and Severe Costs on Russia for Putin’s Purported Annexation of Regions of Ukraine

Treasury Sanctions International Suppliers for Supporting Russia’s Defense Sector and Warns of Costs for Those Outside Russia Who Provide Political or Economic Support for Russia’s Purported Annexation

WASHINGTON – Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated 14 persons in Russia’s military-industrial complex, including two international suppliers, three key leaders of Russia’s financial infrastructure, immediate family members of some of senior Russian officials, and 278 members of Russia’s legislature for enabling Russia’s sham referenda and attempt to annex sovereign Ukrainian territory. In addition, OFAC issued new guidance that warns of the heightened sanctions risk that international actors outside of Russia would face for providing political or economic support to Russia as a result of its illegal attempts to change the status of Ukrainian territory.

“We will not stand by as Putin fraudulently attempts to annex parts of Ukraine. The Treasury Department and U.S. government are taking sweeping action today to further weaken Russia’s already degraded military industrial complex and undermine its ability to wage its illegal war,” said Treasury Secretary Janet L. Yellen. “We are also targeting key leaders in Russia’s financial architecture as part of our aggressive and coordinated effort to hold Putin and his enablers accountable for his unprovoked invasion, and limit their ability to prop up their economy. The Treasury Department, U.S. government, and our allies will not hesitate to take swift and severe actions against individuals and companies inside and outside of Russia who are complicit in this war and these sham referendums.”

OFAC’s actions are taken in concert with additional actions by the Department of Commerce and the Department of State. The Department of Commerce is issuing a clear warning of the heightened risks of entities inside and outside of Russia becoming subject to U.S. export controls for supporting Russia’s military and is also adding 57 entities to the Entity List for violating U.S. export controls. State is imposing sanctions on family members of the U.S.-designated mayor of Moscow, who is also a member of Russia’s Security Council, and visa restrictions on Russian national Ochur-Suge Mongush for torturing a Ukrainian prisoner of war. The Department of State is also taking steps to impose visa restrictions on an additional 910 individuals, including members of the Russian Federation’s military, Belarusian military officials, and Russia’s proxies acting in Russia-held portions of Ukraine.   

GUIDANCE ON HEIGHTENED SANCTIONS RISK FOR SUPPORT OF RUSSIA AS A RESULT OF ITS SHAM REFERENDA

On September 23, G7 Leaders issued a statement condemning Russia’s sham referenda and noting their collective readiness to impose further economic costs on Russia, and on individuals and entities both inside and outside of Russia that provide political or economic support for Russia’s illegal attempts to change the status of Ukrainian territory. In support of this commitment, OFAC issued Frequently Asked Question (FAQ) 1091, which emphasizes that OFAC is prepared to more aggressively use its existing sanctions authorities, including E.O. 13660, E.O. 14024, and E.O. 14065, to target persons — inside or outside Russia — whose activities may constitute material assistance, sponsorship, or provision of financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services (together “material support”) to or in support of persons sanctioned pursuant to those Executive orders, or sanctionable activity related to Russia’s sham referenda, purported annexation, and continued occupation of the Kherson, Zaporizhzhya, Donetsk, and Luhansk regions of Ukraine.

In particular, OFAC will leverage existing authorities to target entities and individual jurisdictions outside Russia that provide political or economic support for Russia’s illegal attempt to annex Ukrainian sovereign territory, including for (i) providing material support for the organization of Russia’s sham referenda or purported annexation, as well as economic or other activity that seeks to legitimize Russia’s sham referenda or purported annexation; (ii) providing material support to Russia’s military and defense industrial base, including transactions by persons in third countries that provide material support to Russia’s military, defense industrial base, and designated entities and persons operating or that have operated in Russia’s defense industrial base; (iii) attempting to circumvent or evade U.S. sanctions on Russia and Belarus; and (iv) providing material support to Russian entities or individuals that are subject to certain blocking sanctions.

As noted in the FAQ, OFAC sanctions are not designed to target Ukraine or Ukrainians, including those living in areas occupied or purportedly annexed by Russia. Also as noted in the FAQ, OFAC will generally not impose sanctions on non-U.S. persons that engage in transactions that would be authorized for U.S. persons, such as certain energy-related transactions.

This measure is also being complemented by Commerce’s guidance on the heightened risks of entities inside and outside of Russia becoming subject to U.S. export controls for supporting Russia’s military. These measures are being driven in coordination with our allies and partners, including the European Union which announced it is developing new authorities to target the circumvention of sanctions. Collectively, these actions make it clear that the United States and its partners and allies will continue to hold actors around the world accountable for attempting to undercut our sanctions or support Russia’s malign activity.

RUSSIA’S DEFENSE PROCUREMENT AROUND THE WORLD

OFAC is immediately implementing the G7 Leaders’ commitment and the new guidance outlined in FAQ 1091 by designating several international suppliers and associated individuals that have supported Russia’s defense sector. Through its historically unprecedented campaign of sanctions and export controls, the United States and an international coalition of allies and partners have devastated Russia’s ability to access foreign components and technology. As a result, Russia’s defense-industrial base is desperate to provision its war efforts and has resorted to third-country intermediaries and suppliers. Today’s action is also complemented by Commerce’s listing of 57 Russian entities on the Entity List for acquiring and attempting to acquire U.S.-origin items in support of the Russian military.

Illicit Procurement Network

Today’s action includes additional designations against the network of Radioavtomatika, a U.S.- designated Russian defense procurement firm that specializes in procuring foreign items for Russia’s defense industry and continues its attempts to evade sanctions. Today’s designation of recently established front companies and foreign intermediaries highlights the U.S. government’s continuing efforts to impose costs upon global actors for their support to Russia’s defense sector.

Vladimir Aleksandrovich Ivanov (Ivanov), Sergey Vyacheslavovich Byzov (Byzov), and Dmitrii Vladimirovich Galin (Galin) are all Russia-based individuals who represented Radioavtomatika on its leadership team. Ivanov is the company’s general director, Byzov is the First Deputy General Director, and Galin is a Deputy General Director and a shareholder of the firm.

Ivanov, Byzov, and Galin were designated today pursuant to E.O. 14024 for being or having been leaders, officials, senior executive officers, or members of the boards of directors of Radioavtomatika, an entity whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024.

Novastream Limited (Novastream) is a Russian firm established in April 2022. Novastream was established in close coordination with Radioavtomatika officials and has supplied goods to Radioavtomatika. In fact, Novastream maintains the same address as a former Radioavtomatika representative office. Its General Director, Andrei Vladimirovich Khokhlov (Khokhlov), was previously a leader of Radioavtomatika and was specifically linked to one of its representative offices.

Novastream was designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Radioavtomatika. Khokhlov was designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for being or having been a leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of Novastream and for being or having been a leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of Radioavtomatika.

OFAC today also designated two third-country entities supporting Radioavtomatika. Sinno Electronics Co., Limited (Sinno), a People’s Republic of China supplier of Radioavtomatika, and Taco LLC (Taco), an Armenian supplier. Sinno, with awareness of restrictions on exports to Russia, has maintained a continuing relationship with Radioavtomaika before and after Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine. In June, Sinno was placed on Commerce’s Entity List for providing support to Russia’s military and/or defense industrial base and for continuing to contract to supply Russian entity listed and sanctioned parties after Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine. Radioavtomatika pays Taco for importing components and handling the procurement process within Armenia. Furthermore, both Sinno and Taco have interacted with each other in relation to their work with Radioavtomatika.

Both Sinno and Taco were designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of Radioavtomatika. Sinno was previously added to the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Entity List on June 28, 2022.

Belarusian Supplier of Russia’s Defense-Industrial Base

As part of its ongoing global efforts to target suppliers of Russia’s defense-industrial base, OFAC designated Open Joint Stock Company Svetlogorsk Khimvolokno (Sohim), which provides critical material to Russia’s defense industry. Sohim is a Belarusian state-owned textile and fiber manufacturer that exports to Russia.

Sohim was designated today pursuant to E.O. 14038 for being owned or controlled by, or for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the Government of Belarus.

Russian Technology and Defense Firms

Treasury additionally took action today against multiple firms determined to operate or have operated in the defense and related material sector and/or the technology sector of the Russian Federation economy.

Scientific-Technical Center for Electronic Warfare, also known as AO NTTs REB, engages in research and development for Russia’s Ministry of Defense. AO NTTs REB is involved in the development of an electronic warfare system used by drones in combat, which is used by Russia’s Armed Forces. In addition, OFAC today designated Aleksandr Pavlovich Sarkisyan (Sarkisyan), the General Director of AO NTTs REB. Sarkisyan previously worked at Rosoboroneksport OAO, another designated Russian defense firm.

Rotek Elpom (Rotek), creates the Raven-Black line of stationary and vehicular-mounted security systems that use a combination of acoustic, light, and infrasound technology to impact the nervous systems of its targets. Rotek’s products are used in the aviation and crowd control sectors.

ZAO NTTs Modul (Modul) produces computer equipment and software. Modul’s products are used in Russia’s aviation and space sectors.

OOO Valtex-ST (Valtex-ST) procures high technology scientific and industrial equipment on behalf of companies operating in Russia, including quantum optics instrumentation, high-purity gas generators, and electronic microscopy systems.

OAO Radioavionika (Radioavionika) produces various technological products, including for Russia’s Ministry of Defense. In particular, Radioavionika has developed a command-and-control system used by Russia’s soldiers.

AO NTTs REB, Rotek, Modul, Valtex-ST, and Radioavionika were designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the technology sector of the Russian Federation economy. AO NTTS REB and Radioavionika were additionally designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the defense and related materiel sector of the Russian Federation economy. Sarkisyan was designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for being or having been a leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of AO NTTS REB. Radioavionika is also sanctioned by Canada.

TARGETING RUSSIA’S FINANCIAL LEADERSHIP

In response to Russia’s February 2022 further invasion of Ukraine, the United States and an international coalition of allies and partners took swift action to restrict Russia’s access to global financial markets. In response, Russia has scrambled to find new ways to process payments and conduct transactions. Directly and indirectly, Russia’s financial technocrats have supported the Kremlin’s unprovoked war. Today’s actions target key figures who, through their top leadership positions, have personally enriched themselves while facilitating Putin’s war in Ukraine, actively undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and political independence of Ukraine.

Elvira Sakhipzadovna Nabiullina (Nabiullina) is the Governor of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (CBR), which is subject to an array of sanctions, and a former advisor to U.S.-designated Russian President Vladimir Putin (Putin). Since becoming the Governor of the CBR in 2013, she has overseen its efforts to protect the Kremlin from Western sanctions imposed as a response to Russia’s occupation of Ukraine’s Crimea in 2014 and further invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Nabiullina was designated pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 for being or having been a leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of the Government of the Russian Federation (GoR). Australia and Canada have also imposed sanctions on Nabiullina.

Olga Nikolaevna Skorobogatova (Skorobogatova) is the First Deputy Governor of the CBR. In her role, Skorobogatova is responsible for the oversight of Russia’s Mir National Payment System and CBR’s operations in Russian and foreign financial markets. This designation builds on action OFAC took when it published FAQ 1082 to provide additional guidance on the heightened risk of facilitating Russia’s efforts to evade sanctions through the expanded use of the National Payment Card System or the Mir National Payment System, given the broad sanctions imposed on Russia’s financial system this year.

Skorobogatova was designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the financial services sector of the Russian Federation economy, and for being or having been a leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of the GoR.

Aleksandr Valentinovich Novak (Novak) is a Russian Deputy Prime Minister. Novak has held various roles in the GoR during his career and has been heavily involved in Russia’s efforts to increase its economic output abroad.

Novak was designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for being or having been a leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of the GoR.

IMMEDIATE FAMILY MEMBERS OF TOP-RANKING OFFICIALS

It is common for Russian politicians to camouflage their inordinate and unearned wealth by putting assets or property under the names of family members or other close associates. Therefore, to avoid sanctions evasion efforts by Russian elites, OFAC re-designated two of Russia’s top-ranking officials and their immediate family members as well as the immediate family members of several other top-ranking officials.  OFAC will continue to aggressively target these proxies and expose the schemes by which Russian politicians hide their wealth.

Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Kuzhugetovich Shoigu (Shoigu) was re-designated today after previously being designated on February 25, 2022, pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the defense and related material sector of the Russian Federation economy. OFAC also designated Shoigu’s wife, Irina Aleksandrovna Shoigu (Irina), and adult daughters, Yuliya Sergeyevna Shoigu (Yuliya) and Kseniya Sergeyevna Shoigu (Kseniya). Yuliya works at Russia’s Ministry for Civil Defense, Emergencies, and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters, which her father previously ran for more than 20 years. Kseniya is a finance executive who has made tens of millions of dollars on state construction projects and has business interests directly tied to the Ministry of Defense.

Shoigu was designated today pursuant to E.O. 14024 for being or having been a leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of the GoR. Irina, Yuliya, and Kseniya were designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for being a spouse or adult child of Shoigu. Shoigu has also been sanctioned by Australia, Canada, the European Union (EU), Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (UK).

Russian National Guard head Viktor Vasiliyevich Zolotov (Zolotov) was re-designated today after previously being designated on March 15, 2022, pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the defense and related material sector of the Russian Federation economy. Zolotov as also previously designated on April 6, 2018, pursuant to E.O. 13661 for being an official of the GoR. OFAC also designated Zolotov’s adult children Roman Viktorovich Zolotov (Roman) and Zhanna Viktorovna Zolotova (Zhanna) and son-in-law Yuriy Valeryevich Chechikhin (Chechikhin). Zolotov’s family collectively owns millions of dollars of real estate, and Roman, who earns a small salary at Russia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs, owns a vacation home in the same south Russian town as Russian President Vladimir Putin’s palace.

Chechikhin is a business partner of U.S.-designated Russian oligarch Oleg Vladimirovich Deripaska. OFAC also designated Obshchestvo s Ogranichennoi Otvetstvennostyu Markus (OOO Markus), a computer programming company in Moscow owned by Chechikhin.

Zolotov was designated today pursuant to E.O. 14024 for being or having been a leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of the GoR. Roman and Zhanna were designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for being a spouse or adult child of Zolotov. Zolotov has also been sanctioned by Australia, Canada, the EU, Japan, New Zealand, and the UK.

Chechikhin and OOO Markus were designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the technology sector of the Russian Federation economy.

The Speaker of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation, Valentina Ivanovna Matviyenko (Matviyenko) was previously designated by OFAC on April 6, 2022, pursuant to E.O. 14024 for being a leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of the GoR. On March 16, 2014, the President included Matviyenko in the Annex to E.O. 13661.Today, OFAC designated her son, St. Petersburg businessman Sergey Vladimirovich Matviyenko (Sergey).

Sergey was designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for being a spouse or adult child of Matviyenko.

Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Vladimirovich Mishustin (Mishustin) was designated on April 6, 2022, pursuant to E.O. 14024 for being a leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of the GoR. Today, OFAC designated his wife, Vladlena Yuryevna Mishustina (Vladlena), and two adult sons, Aleksey Mikhaylovich Mishustin (Aleksey) and Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Mishustin (Aleksandr). The Mishustin family owns $45 million worth of Moscow-area real estate, some of which are held in Aleksey and Aleksandr’s names. Aleksey and Aleksandr studied at an elite boarding school in Switzerland.

Vladlena, Aleksey, and Aleksandr were designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for being a spouse or adult child of Mishustin.

Saint Petersburg Governor and Russian Security Council member Aleksandr Dmitrievich Beglov (Beglov) was designated on April 6, 2022, pursuant to E.O 14024 for being a leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of the GoR. Today, OFAC sanctioned his wife, Natalya Vladimirovna Beglova (Natalya), and daughters, Yuliya Aleksandrovna Belova (Belova) and Olga Aleksandrovna Beglova (Olga). Natalya is tied to suspicious financial behavior and Olga has been connected to relatives of U.S.-designated Russian oligarch Yuri Valentinovich Kovalchuk.

Natalya, Belova, and Olga were designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for being a spouse or adult child of Beglov.

The Deputy Chairman of the Russian Federation Security Council, former Prime Minister, and former President Dmitry Anatolievich Medvedev (Medvedev) was previously designated on April 6, 2022, pursuant to E.O. 14024 for being or having been a leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of the GoR.  Today OFAC designated his wife, Svetlana Vladimirovna Medvedeva (Svetlana), and adult son, Ilya Dmitrievich Medvedev (Ilya).

Svetlana and Ilya were designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for being a spouse or adult child of Medvedev.

THE FEDERATION COUNCIL

Today OFAC designated the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation (Federation Council) pursuant to E.O. 14024 for being a political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the GoR.

Russia’s Federation Council voted unanimously in February 2022 to approve Putin’s request to send troops into Ukraine, which provided an unjustified pretext for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The Federation Council members also approved a Russian law threatening prison time for those publishing what the Russian authorities consider to be false information about the country’s further invasion of Ukraine, which the Kremlin refers to as a “special military operation.”

While Ukraine and its Western allies have condemned the referenda in the Russian-controlled eastern and southern regions as illegitimate, the Chairwoman of the Federation Council, Valentina Matviyenko, claimed in late September that they comply with international norms and the U.N. Charter.   

On February 25, 2022, OFAC designated Matviyenko. Today, OFAC is designating all of Matviyenko’s 169 Federation Council colleagues pursuant to E.O. 14024 for being or having been leaders, officials, senior executive officers, or members of the board of directors of the GoR. These are:

  1. Ivan Nikolayevich Abramov
  2. Yelena Vladimirovna Afanaseva
  3. Mikhail Alexandrovich Afanasov
  4. Mohmad Isaevich Akhmadov
  5. Alexander Konstantinovich Akimov
  6. Oleg Aleksandrovich Alekseev
  7. Ekateryna Borysovna Altabaeva*
  8. Sergei Petrovich Arenin
  9. Yuri Viktorovich Arkharov
  10. Anatoly Dmitrievich Artamonov
  11. Elena Osipovna Avdeeva
  12. Mukharbek Oybertovich Barakhoyev
  13. Alexander Davidovich Bashkin
  14. Andrey Alexandrovich Bazilevsky
  15. Vladimir Andreyevich Beketov
  16. Mikhail Vladimirovich Belousov
  17. Sergei Vladimirovich Berezkin
  18. Sergei Vyacheslavovich Bezdenezhnykh
  19. Yelena Vasilyevna Bibikova
  20. Viktor Nikolayevich Bondarev
  21. Yegor Afanasyevich Borisov
  22. Sergey Fateevich Brilka
  23. Alexander Yuryevich Bryksin
  24. Andrey Vladimirovich Chernyshev
  25. Vadim Yevgenyevich Dengin
  26. Konstantin Konstantinovich Dolgov
  27. Alexander Vlademirovich Dvoinykh
  28. Vladimir Mikhailovich Dzhabarov*
  29. Gennady Egorovich Emelyanov
  30. Olga Nikolayevna Epifanova
  31. Arsen Suleymanovich Fadzayev
  32. Yury Viktorovich Fedorov
  33. Nikolai Vasilyevich Fyodorov
  34. Rimma Fyodorovna Galushina
  35. Suleiman Sadulayevich Geremeyev
  36. Airat Minerasikhovich Gibatdinov
  37. Tatyana Anatolyevna Gigel
  38. Lyubov Nikolayevna Glebova
  39. Dmitry Yuryevich Goritsky
  40. Sergei Vasilyevich Gornyakov
  41. Vladimir Filippovich Gorodetskiy
  42. Svetlana Petrovna Goryacheva
  43. Lilia Salavatovna Gumerova
  44. Alexander Vladislavovich Gusakovsky
  45. Denis Vladimirovich Gusev
  46. Vasily Nikolayevich Ikonnikov
  47. Eduard Vladimirovich Isakov
  48. Sergey Borisovich Ivanov
  49. Sergey Viktorovich Kalashnik
  50. Arsen Bashirovich Kanokov
  51. Grigory Borisovich Karasin
  52. Alexander Alexandrovich Karelin
  53. Galina Nikolayevna Karelova
  54. Alexander Bogdanovich Karlin
  55. Maksim Gennadyevich Kavdzharadze
  56. Krym Olievich Kazanokov
  57. Suleyman Abusaidovich Kerimov*
  58. Belan Bagaudinovich Khamchiev
  59. Murat Krym-Gerievich Khapsirokov
  60. Oksana Vladimirovna Khlyakina
  61. Olga Nikolayevna Khokhlova
  62. Andrey Igoryevich Kislov
  63. Sergei Ivanovich Kislyak
  64. Andrey Akardyevich Klimov
  65. Andrey Aleksandrovich Klishas*
  66. Sergey Nikolayevich Kolbin
  67. Aleksey Nikolayevich Kondratenko
  68. Nikolai Fyodorovich Kondratyuk
  69. Konstantin Iosifovich Kosachev*
  70. Natalia Vladimirovna Kosykhina
  71. Olga Fedorovna Kovitidi
  72. Irina Andreyevna Kozhanova
  73. Vladimir Igorevich Kozhin*
  74. Vladimir Kasimirovich Kravchenko
  75. Viktor Melkhiorovich Kress
  76. Vladimir Igorevich Krugly
  77. Nina Germanovna Kulikovskih
  78. Andrey Viktorovich Kutepov
  79. Dmitry Gennadyevich Kuzmin
  80. Yulia Viktorovna Lazutkina
  81. Vladimir Albertovich Lebedev
  82. Grigory Petrovich Ledkov
  83. Sergey Nikolaevich Lukin
  84. Taimuraz Dzhambekovich Mamsurov
  85. Sergey Alexandrovich Martynov
  86. Alexei Petrovich Mayorov
  87. Sergei Patrovich Mikhailov
  88. Sergei Gerasimovich Mitin
  89. Yelena Borisovna Mizulina*
  90. Igor Nikolayevich Morozov
  91. Farit Mubarakshevich Mukhametshin
  92. Sergey Nikolayevich Muratov
  93. Vyacheslav Vladimirovich Nagovitsyn
  94. Alexander Vladimirovich Narolin
  95. Lyudmila Borisovna Narusova
  96. Aleksandr Nikolaevich Nekrasov
  97. Boris Alexandrovich Nevzorov
  98. Alexander Valeryevich Nikitin
  99. Alexander Vyacheslavovich Noviukhov
  100. Viktor Feodosyevich Novozhilov
  101. Gennady Ivanovich Ordenov
  102. Alexei Maratovich Orlov
  103. Anna Ivanovna Otke
  104. Dina Ivanovna Oyun
  105. Igor Vladimirovich Panchenko
  106. Margarita Nikolayevna Pavlova
  107. Dmitry Sergeyevich Perminov
  108. Sergey Nikolayevich Perminov
  109. Yelena Alekseyevna Perminova
  110. Irina Alexandrovna Petina
  111. Elena Vladimirovna Pisareva
  112. Vladimir Vladimirovich Poletayev
  113. Valeriy Andreevich Ponomarev
  114. Alexander Yuryevich Pronyushkin
  115. Alexei Konstantinovich Pushkov*
  116. Alexander Vasilyevich Rakitin
  117. Grigoriy Alexeyevich Rapota
  118. Nikolay Ivanovich Rizhkov*
  119. Eduard Ergartovich Rossel
  120. Irina Valeryevna Rukavishnikova
  121. Sergey Nikolayevich Ryabukhin
  122. Lenar Rinatovich Safin
  123. Tatiana Anatolyevna Sakharova
  124. Akhmat Anzorovich Salpagarov
  125. Evgeny Stepanovich Savchenko
  126. Dmitry Vladimirovich Savelyev
  127. Alexander Alexandrovich Savin
  128. Nikolai Petrovich Semisotov
  129. Valery Vladimirovich Semyonov
  130. Artem Gennadyevich Sheikin
  131. Andrei Anatolyevich Shevchenko
  132. Anatoly Ivanovich Shirokov
  133. Elena Borisovna Shumilova
  134. Alexei Vladimirovich Sinitsyn
  135. Lyudmila Nikolayevna Skakovskaya
  136. Galina Nikolayevna Solodun
  137. Inna Yuryevna Svyatenko
  138. Lyudmila Zaumovna Talabayeva
  139. Pavel Vladimirovich Tarakanov
  140. Vyacheslav Stepanovich Timchenko
  141. Oleg Polikarpovich Tkach
  142. Serhiy Pavlovich Tsekov*
  143. Oleg Vladimirovich Tsepkin
  144. Peter Nikolayevich Tultaev
  145. Andrey Anatolyevich Turchak
  146. Mukharby Magomedovich Ulbashev
  147. Ilyas Magomed-Salamovich Umahanov
  148. Valery Petrovich Usatyuk
  149. Alexander Vladelenovich Vainberg
  150. Yuri Konstantinovich Valyaev
  151. Alexander Georgyevich Varfolomeev
  152. Dmitriy Yuryevich Vasilenko
  153. Valery Nikolayevich Vasilyev
  154. Nikolay Nikolayevich Vladimirov
  155. Yury Leonidovich Vorobyov
  156. Alexander Gennadyevich Vysokinsky
  157. Gennady Vladimirovich Yagubov
  158. Irek Ishmukhametovich Yalalov
  159. Alexander Georgievich Yaroshuk
  160. Andrey Vladimirovich Yatskin
  161. Andrei Nikolayevich Yepishin
  162. Olga Sergeyevna Zabralova
  163. Bair Bayaskhalanovich Zhamsuyev
  164. Aleksandr Arkadyevich Zhukov
  165. Anastasia Gennadyevna Zhukova
  166. Nikolai Andreyevich Zhuravlev
  167. Yelena Gennadyevna Zlenko
  168. Viktor Viktororvich Zobnev
  169. Igor Dmitryevich Zubarev

OFAC previously designated ten of these members of the Federation Council, indicated above with an asterisk, pursuant to E.O. 13660 or E.O. 13661.

The EU and the UK have designated the majority of the above members of the Federation Council.

ADDITIONAL RUSSIAN DUMA OFFICIALS

As part of its response over the last seven months to Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine, OFAC designated the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation (State Duma) and 340 of its members who voted to recognize the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic earlier this year. The State Duma’s leadership has endorsed plans for these referenda, expressing support for alleged interest in such regions becoming part of Russia.

The members of the State Duma this year unanimously passed a law criminalizing the distribution of “fake news” about the Russian military. Russian media’s reporting on Russia’s war of choice in Ukraine is tightly monitored by Russian authorities. Some of Russia’s State Duma members have played a key role in spreading Russian disinformation about the war.

Today OFAC is designating the remaining 109 State Duma members pursuant to E.O. 14024 for being or having been leaders, officials, senior executive officers, or members of the board of directors of the Government of the Russian Federation. This action follows efforts by Russian occupying forces in eastern and southern Ukraine to call for referenda that would declare occupied territory as part of Russia.

  1. Olga Nikolaevna Alimova
  2. Georgy Konstantinovich Arapov
  3. Otary Ionovich Arshba
  4. Sardana Vladimirovna Avksentieva
  5. Alexander Mikhailovich Babakov*
  6. Konstantin Mikhailovich Bakharev*
  7. Dmitry Anatolievich Belik*
  8. Mikhail Nikolaevich Berulava
  9. Larisa Nikolaevna Buranova
  10. Roza Basirovna Chemeris
  11. Alexey Vasilievich Chepa
  12. Artur Nikolaevich Chilingarov
  13. Vyacheslav Anatolievich Damdintsurunov
  14. Vladislav Andreyevich Davankov
  15. Adam Sultanovich Delimkhanov*
  16. Alexander Vyacheslavovich Demin
  17. Oksana Genrikhovna Dmitrieva
  18. Elena Grigorievna Drapeko
  19. Alexey Vasilievich Gordeyev
  20. Ksenia Alexandrovna Goryacheva
  21. Anatoly Nikolaevich Greshnevikov
  22. Maxim Alexeyevich Gulin
  23. Vladimir Vladimirovich Gutenev
  24. Amir Makhsudovich Hamitov
  25. Sholban Valerievich Kara-ool
  26. Raisa Vasilievna Karmazina
  27. Artem Alexandrovich Kavinov
  28. Olga Mikhailovna Kazakova
  29. Alexander Evseyevich Khinshtein
  30. Gleb Yakovlevich Khor
  31. Dmitry Anatolievich Khubezov
  32. Artem Yurievich Kiriyanov
  33. Mikhail Sergeyevich Kiselev
  34. Dmitry Nikolaevich Kobylkin
  35. Robert Ivanovich Kochiev
  36. Lev Igorevich Kovpak
  37. Pavel Vladimirovich Krasheninnikov
  38. Andrey Leonidovich Krasov
  39. Rizvan Daniyalovich Kurbanov
  40. Eduard Anatolievich Kuznetsov
  41. Anna Yurievna Kuznetsova
  42. Tatiana Petrovna Larionova
  43. Oleg Yurievich Leonov
  44. Andrey Mikhailovich Makarov
  45. Evgeny Evgenievich Marchenko
  46. Oleg Anatolievich Matveichev
  47. Artem Pavlovich Metelev
  48. Oleg Alexeyevich Mikhailov
  49. Sergey Mikhailovich Mironov*
  50. Oleg Victorovich Morozov
  51. Evgeny Sergeyevich Moskvichev
  52. Zelimkhan Alikoevich Mutsoev
  53. Alexey Gennadievich Nechaev
  54. Sergey Ivanovich Neverov*
  55. Victoria Victorovna Nikolaeva
  56. Nikolay Vladimirovich Novichkov
  57. Vladimir Mikhailovich Novikov
  58. Marat Abdulhaevich Nuriev
  59. Marina Eduardovna Orgeyeva
  60. Sergey Alexandrovich Pahomov
  61. Vladimir Victorovich Pavlov
  62. Alexander Petrovich Petrov
  63. Dmitry Anatolievich Pevtsov
  64. Victor Vitalievich Pinsky
  65. Vasily Ivanovich Piskarev
  66. Vladimir Vladimirovich Plyakin
  67. Alexander Alekseevich Polyakov
  68. Alla Viktorovna Polyakova
  69. Valery Fedorovich Rashkin
  70. Svetlana Victorovna Razvorotneva
  71. Evgeny Vasilievich Revenko
  72. Nikita Gennadyevich Rumyantsev
  73. Dmitry Vadimovich Sablin
  74. Svetlana Evgenievna Savitskaya
  75. Vladimir Anatolievich Shamanov
  76. Rifat Gabdulkhakovich Shayhutdinov
  77. Mikhail Sergeyevich Sheremet*
  78. Grigory Vladimirovich Shilkin
  79. Alexander Mikhailovich Sholokhov
  80. Dmitry Stanislavovich Skrivanov
  81. Leonid Eduardovich Slutsky*
  82. Ivan Alexandrovich Solodovnikov
  83. Tatiana Vasilievna Solomatina
  84. Yuri Arkadievich Stankevich
  85. Alexander Mikhailovich Strelyukhin
  86. Sangadzhi Andreyevich Tarbaev
  87. Valentina Vladimirovna Tereshkova
  88. Olga Victorovna Timofeyeva
  89. Alexey Nikolaevich Tkachev
  90. Anton Olegovich Tkachyov
  91. Alexander Romanovich Tolmachev
  92. Petr Olegovich Tolstoy
  93. Maxim Anatolievich Topilin
  94. Vladislav Alexandrovich Tretiak
  95. Saygidpasha Darbishevich Umakhanov
  96. Dzhasharbek Borisovich Uzdenov
  97. Vladimir Abdualievich Vasiliev
  98. Veronika Valerievna Vlasova
  99. Victor Petrovich Vodolatsky
  100. Alexey Anatolievich Volotskov
  101. Elena Andreyevna Vtorygina
  102. Dmitry Fedorovich Vyatkin
  103. Elena Alexandrovna Yampolskaya
  104. Irina Anatolievna Yarovaya
  105. Konstantin Fedorovich Zatulin
  106. Pavel Nikolaevich Zavalny
  107. Victor Mikhailovich Zavarzin
  108. Alexander Dmitrievich Zhukov
  109. Svetlana Sergeevna Zhurova

OFAC has previously designated eight of these State Duma members, indicated above with an asterisk, pursuant to E.O. 13660, E.O. 13661, or E.O. 13581.

SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS

As a result of today’s designation, all property and interests in property of these persons located in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more in the aggregate by one or more of such persons are also blocked. All transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked or designated persons are prohibited, unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or otherwise exempt. These prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any blocked person and the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.

Identifying information on the individuals and entities sanctioned today.

OCC Allows National Banks and Federal Savings Associations Affected by Hurricane Ian in Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina and South Carolina to Close

News Release 2022-122 | September 29, 2022

WASHINGTON—The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) today issued a proclamation allowing national banks, federal savings associations, and federal branches and agencies of foreign banks to close offices in areas affected by Hurricane Ian in Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina and South Carolina.

In issuing the proclamation, the OCC expects that only those bank offices directly affected by potentially unsafe conditions will close. Those offices should make every effort to reopen as quickly as possible to address the banking needs of their customers.

OCC Bulletin 2012-28, “Supervisory Guidance on Natural Disasters and Other Emergency Conditions” (September 21, 2012), provides guidance on actions bankers could consider implementing when their bank or savings association operates or has customers in areas affected by a natural disaster or other emergency.

Related Links

Media Contact

Carrie Moore
(202) 649-6870

Federal and State Financial Regulatory Agencies Issue Interagency Statement on Supervisory Practices Regarding Financial Institutions Affected by Hurricanes Fiona and Ian

News Release 2022-121 | September 29, 2022

Joint Release

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Conference of State Bank Supervisors
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
National Credit Union Administration
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the National Credit Union Administration, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and state financial regulators, collectively the agencies, recognize the serious impact of Hurricanes Fiona and Ian on the customers and operations of many financial institutions and will provide appropriate regulatory assistance to affected institutions subject to their supervision. The agencies encourage institutions operating in the affected areas to meet the financial services needs of their communities.

A complete list of the affected disaster areas can be found at https://www.fema.gov/disasters.

Lending: The agencies encourage financial institutions to work constructively with borrowers in communities affected by Hurricanes Fiona and Ian. Prudent efforts to adjust or alter terms on existing loans in affected areas are supported by the agencies and should not be subject to examiner criticism. In accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles, institutions should individually evaluate modifications of existing loans to determine whether they represent troubled debt restructurings or modifications to borrowers experiencing financial difficulty, as applicable. In making this evaluation, institutions should consider the facts and circumstances of each borrower and modification. In supervising institutions affected by Hurricanes Fiona and Ian, the agencies will consider the unusual circumstances these institutions face. The agencies recognize that efforts to work with borrowers in communities under stress can be consistent with safe-and-sound practices as well as in the public interest.

Temporary Facilities: The agencies understand that many financial institutions face staffing, power, telecommunications, and other challenges in re-opening facilities after Hurricanes Fiona and Ian. In cases in which operational challenges persist, the primary federal and/or state regulator will expedite, as appropriate, any request to operate temporary facilities to provide more convenient availability of services to those affected by Hurricanes Fiona and Ian. In most cases, a telephone notice to the primary federal and/or state regulator will suffice initially to start the approval process, with necessary written notification being submitted shortly thereafter.

Publishing Requirements: The agencies understand that the damage caused by Hurricanes Fiona and Ian may affect compliance with publishing and other requirements for branch closings, relocations, and temporary facilities under various laws and regulations. Institutions experiencing disaster-related difficulties in complying with any publishing or other requirements should contact their primary federal and/or state regulator.

Regulatory Reporting Requirements: Institutions affected by Hurricanes Fiona and Ian that expect to encounter difficulty meeting the agencies’ reporting requirements should contact their primary federal and/or state regulator to discuss their situation. The agencies do not expect to assess penalties or take other supervisory action against institutions that take reasonable and prudent steps to comply with the agencies’ regulatory reporting requirements if those institutions are unable to fully satisfy those requirements because of Hurricanes Fiona and Ian.

The agencies’ staffs stand ready to work with affected institutions that may be experiencing problems fulfilling their reporting responsibilities, taking into account each institution’s particular circumstances, including the status of its reporting and recordkeeping systems and the condition of its underlying financial records.

Community Reinvestment Act (CRA): Financial institutions may receive CRA consideration for community development loans, investments, or services that revitalize or stabilize federally designated disaster areas in their assessment areas or in the states or regions that include their assessment areas. For additional information, refer to the Interagency Questions and Answers Regarding Community Reinvestment at https://www.ffiec.gov/cra/qnadoc.htm.

Investments: Institutions are encouraged to monitor municipal securities and loans affected by Hurricanes Fiona and Ian. The agencies realize local government projects may be negatively affected by the disaster and encourage institutions to engage in appropriate monitoring and take prudent efforts to stabilize such investments.

For more information, refer to the Interagency Supervisory Examiner Guidance for Institutions Affected by a Major Disaster, which is available as follows:

CSBS: https://www.csbs.org/interagency-supervisory-examiner-guidance-institutions-affected-major-disaster

FDIC: https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2017/fil17062.html

FRB: https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/srletters/sr1714a1.pdf

OCC: https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2017/bulletin-2017-61.html

NCUA: https://www.ncua.gov/regulation-supervision/letters-credit-unions-other-guidance/examiner-guidance-institutions-affected-major-disaster

Media Contacts

CSBS
Laura Fisher
(202) 812-9813

Federal Reserve
Darren Gersh
(202) 452-2955

FDIC
Julianne Fisher Breitbeil
(202) 340-2043

NCUA
Joe Adamoli
(703) 518-6330

OCC
Carrie Moore
(202) 649-6870

TSX Delisting Review – Xebec Adsorption Inc. (XBC)

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Statement by Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen on New Rule Under the Corporate Transparency Act

WASHINGTON – Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen released the following statement following the announcement of a new rule on beneficial ownership reporting under the Corporate Transparency Act.

“Today’s announcement is a major step forward in giving law enforcement, national security agencies, and other partners the information they need to crack down on criminals, corrupt individuals, and other bad actors who seek to take advantage of America’s financial system for illicit purposes. This rule builds on years of bipartisan work by Congress, Treasury, national security and law enforcement agencies, and other stakeholders to bolster corporate transparency while minimizing the impact of compliance on honest businesses.

In doing so, this rule will make it harder for criminals, organized crime rings, and other illicit actors to hide their identities and launder their money through the financial system. It will help strengthen our national security by making it more difficult for oligarchs, terrorists, and other global threats to use complex legal structures to launder money, traffic humans and drugs, and commit other crimes that threaten harm to the American people. And it will help level the playing field for honest businesses that play by the rules but are at a disadvantage when competing against bad actors who use shell companies to evade taxes, hide their illicit wealth, and defraud customers and employees.  On the international front, the rule will also help the U.S. more effectively combat financial crime alongside our partners and allies under strong global standards.

Critically, this rule will also greatly further our Administration’s work to fight corruption and its corrosive effects on our democracy and the rule of law – both at home and around the world.”

Fact Sheet on Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting

###

Treasury Targets Financial and Shipping Facilitators of Iranian Petrochemicals and Petroleum Sales

WASHINGTON — Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned an international network of companies involved in the sale of hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of Iranian petrochemicals and petroleum products to end users in South and East Asia. Today’s action targets Iranian brokers and several front companies in the UAE, Hong Kong, and India that have facilitated financial transfers and shipping of Iranian petroleum and petrochemical products. These entities have played a critical role in concealing the origin of the Iranian shipments and enabling two sanctioned Iranian brokers, Triliance Petrochemical Co. Ltd. (Triliance) and Persian Gulf Petrochemical Industry Commercial Co. (PGPICC), to transfer funds and ship Iranian petroleum and petrochemicals to buyers in Asia. In addition to OFAC’s designations, the Department of State is designating two entities based in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Zhonggu Storage and Transportation Co. Ltd. and WS Shipping Co. Ltd., for their involvement in Iran’s petrochemical trade.

“The United States is committed to severely restricting Iran’s illicit oil and petrochemical sales,” said Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Brian E. Nelson; “So long as Iran refuses a mutual return to full implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the United States will continue to enforce its sanctions on the sale of Iranian petroleum and petrochemical products.”

As Iran continues to accelerate its nuclear program in violation of the JCPOA, we will continue to accelerate our enforcement of sanctions on Iran’s petroleum and petrochemical sales under authorities that would be removed under the JCPOA. These enforcement actions will continue on a regular basis, with an aim to severely restrict Iran’s oil and petrochemical exports. Anyone involved in facilitating these illegal sales and transactions should cease and desist immediately if they wish to avoid U.S. sanctions.

These economic sanctions, which are reversible in the event of Iran’s return to JCPOA compliance, follow the designations imposed last week against the so-called morality police and other law enforcement organizations and individuals responsible for the death in custody of Mahsa Amini and the violent repression of the protests that have followed. We remain concerned about a wide range of Iranian policies, from their nuclear program, to abuses perpetrated against their own people, to supporting Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine with drones and military training, and destabilizing activities across the region, and we will continue to respond to these dangerous policies with sanctions and other tools.

Today’s action is being taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13846 and follows OFAC’s August 1, 2022 designation of companies supporting Iranian petrochemical conglomerate PGPICC; the July 6, 2022 designation of a Persian Gulf-based network facilitating Iranian petrochemical and petroleum sales; and a June 16, 2022 action targeting an international sanctions evasion network supporting Iranian petrochemical sales in East Asia.

Triliance Petrochemical Co. Ltd. Network

Triliance, a critical component of Iran’s petroleum and petrochemical sectors, which brokers the sale of Iranian products to foreign purchasers, has purchased millions of dollars’ worth of Iranian petrochemical and petroleum products from Iran-based petrochemical brokers Iran Chemical Industries Investment Company and Middle East Kimiya Pars Co., which were ultimately shipped to India. 

Triliance was previously designated pursuant to E.O 13846 in 2020 for, on or after November 5, 2018, having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of, the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). NIOC itself is sanctioned pursuant to E.O. 13599, and also E.O. 13224, a counterterrorism sanctions authority.

India-based petrochemical company Tibalaji Petrochem Private Limited has purchased millions of dollars’ worth of Triliance-brokered petrochemical products, including methanol and base oil, for onward shipment to China. 

Triliance relies upon intermediary front companies to effectuate the sale of Iranian products to purchasers in South and East Asia. Hong Kong-based front company Sierra Vista Trading Limited was used to conceal petrochemical purchases worth millions of dollars from Iranian producers for onward shipment to China.  

Triliance also utilized front companies to pay UAE-based Clara Shipping LLC millions of dollars in freight charges for the shipment of Iranian petrochemical and petroleum products to  East Asia. UAE-based Virgo Marine has similarly received the equivalent of millions of dollars from Triliance since early 2022 to arrange vessels for the storage and transportation of Iranian petrochemicals. Virgo Marine has operated the liquid petroleum gas tanker Gas Allure, which transported tens of thousands of metric tons of Iranian petrochemicals brokered by Triliance.

Iran Chemical Industries Investment Company, Middle East Kimiya Pars Co., Tibalaji Petrochem Private Limited, Sierra Vista Trading Limited, Clara Shipping LLC, and Virgo Marine are all being designated pursuant to E.O. 13846 for, on or after November 5, 2018, having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of, Triliance. The Gas Allure is also being identified as property in which Virgo Marine has an interest pursuant to E.O. 13846. 

Persian Gulf Petrochemical Industries Commercial Company 

Hong Kong-based Sophychem HK Limited has purchased tens of millions of dollars’ worth of Iranian petrochemicals from PGPICC for onward shipment to China and Singapore. ML Holding Group Limited helped facilitate tens of millions of dollars’ worth of similar Iranian petrochemical sales to China for PGPICC. PGPICC is a subsidiary of Persian Gulf Petrochemical Industry Company (PGPIC), which is responsible for roughly half of Iran’s petrochemical exports. 

PGPICC was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 on June 7, 2019, for being owned or controlled by PGPIC, which was itself designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 that same day for providing financial support to Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters, the engineering conglomerate of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.  

Sophychem HK Limited and ML Holding Group Limited are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13846 for, on or after November 5, 2018, having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of, PGPICC.   

Sanctions Implications 

As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of these targets that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons must be blocked and reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all dealings by U.S. persons or within the United States (including transactions transiting the United States) that involve any property or interests in property of blocked or designated persons.

In addition, persons that engage in certain transactions with the individuals and entities designated today may themselves be exposed to sanctions or subject to an enforcement action. Furthermore, unless an exception applies, any foreign financial institution that knowingly facilitates a significant transaction or provides significant financial services for any of the individuals or entities designated today could be subject to U.S. sanctions.

The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, please refer to OFAC’s Frequently Asked Question 897 here.  For detailed information on the process to submit a request for removal from an OFAC sanctions list, please visit here.

Click here for identifying information on the individuals and entities designated today.
 

READOUT: U.S. Department of the Treasury and the Office of the U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Climate (SPEC) Host Discussion with Asset Managers and Insurers on the Opportunities and Challenges of Incorporating Climate Considerations into Investment

WASHINGTON—Yesterday, the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the Office of the U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Climate (SPEC) hosted a discussion with asset managers and insurers that are working to incorporate climate considerations into investment decisions and greenhouse gas reduction commitments, including net-zero commitments. Under Secretary for Domestic Finance Nellie Liang and officials from across the Treasury Department and SPEC engaged asset managers and insurers to better understand how climate risks impact their investments, opportunities for engagement activities, enhanced climate disclosures, and key considerations associated with greenhouse gas reduction and climate adaptation efforts, both organizationally and with respect to their clients. The discussion focused on climate-related best practices, opportunities, and ongoing challenges associated with asset management and insurance investment activities. The discussion was part of an ongoing effort by Treasury and SPEC to engage external stakeholders that are committed to supporting and expediting the transition to a low-carbon economy. Treasury and SPEC are interested in finding ways to encourage transparent and accountable progress toward meeting climate challenges and goals.

###

Testimony of Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes Elizabeth Rosenberg Before the Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate

As Prepared for Delivery

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and distinguished Members of the Foreign Relations Committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today and provide an update on the Department of the Treasury’s efforts to hold Russia accountable for its brutal and unjustified further invasion of Ukraine.

The U.S. Department of the Treasury is a key agency working alongside others across the Administration to implement the U.S. government’s holistic response to Putin’s war. Since the further invasion began six months ago, we have been advancing President Biden’s promise to “squeeze Russia’s access to finance and technology for strategic sectors of its economy and degrade its industrial capacity for years to come.”1

Just recently, we imposed additional sanctions to further degrade Russia’s ability to rebuild its military, hold the perpetrators of this war accountable, and further financially isolate Putin. To date, Treasury has sanctioned hundreds of Russian individuals and entities, cutting them off from the U.S. financial system. This includes a majority of Russia’s largest financial institutions, key nodes in their military-industrial supply chains, and the oligarchs and cronies who steal from the Russian people to line their own pockets and help Putin perpetuate his war. For example, Treasury’s sanctions over the last few months, including our latest tranche, have targeted elites tied to the Kremlin, firms connected to Russian steel production and the military-industrial base, and sanctions evasion networks operating on behalf of designated Russian entities. They have also exposed Russian agents and entities involved with Russian government efforts to promulgate disinformation and election interference in the U.S. and Ukraine.

Treasury has also implemented restrictions on dealings in Russian sovereign debt; prohibited economic dealings with the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic regions of Ukraine; prohibited new investment in the Russian Federation, and imposed services bans covering the provision of quantum computing, accounting, trust and corporate formation, and management consulting services to any person located in the Russian federation. We have also imposed prohibitions on importing certain commodities from Russia into the United States, including oil and natural gas, and similarly imposed prohibitions on exporting certain items like luxury goods and dollar-denominated banknotes.

The United States has been joined by over 30 countries—representing more than half of the global economy—in imposing these measures. The G7, the EU, and other partners like South Korea, Singapore, and Australia have joined us in implementing the largest sanctions regime in modern history. To complement these targeted measures, Treasury has worked alongside colleagues at the Department of Justice to develop unprecedented and wide-reaching international information exchange activities with partner countries, including through the Russian Elites, Proxies, and Oligarchs (REPO) Task Force. These efforts facilitate our ability to share intelligence, law enforcement data, and relevant financial records in order to expose shadowy economic and commercial Russian evasion networks. We are also working with allies and the Government of Ukraine to examine how we may best use Russian assets that have been frozen and forfeited to support the people of Ukraine.

In addition, Treasury has mounted an aggressive campaign to close the global financial policy and regulatory loopholes across jurisdictions that Russian aiders and abettors of this war, and other criminals, use to perpetuate their illicit activity. At home, this includes three key regulatory efforts: FinCEN’s work to stand up a beneficial ownership database pursuant to the Corporate Transparency Act, developing new disclosure requirements for non-financed purchases of real estate, and ongoing analysis related to the illicit finance risks presented by investment advisers and funds. FinCEN has also issued several Russia-related alerts, including on Russia’s attempts to evade sanctions. Abroad, Treasury is working to strengthen global standards for corporate transparency through the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and enhance its focus on using financial transparency tools to combat the scourge of corruption. This includes launching new efforts at the FATF to address abuse of Citizenship by Investment, or so-called golden passport programs, and the risks for money laundering, corruption, and evasion of sanctions posed by financial gatekeepers and Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs). Notably, FATF has also taken the unprecedented step of downgrading Russia’s standing within FATF as a result of its war in Ukraine, further delegitimizing it in the eyes of the international financial community.

On the other side, Russian propagandists have been hard at work. In the style of the former Soviet Union, Moscow is aggressively attempting to bury any unfavorable news and push the paradoxical narrative—and misinformation—that sanctions are simultaneously not working and yet also cause food insecurity. In fact, Russia’s invasion spiked the price of energy earlier this year by 21 percent. Russia’s months-long blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports, coupled with the purposeful destruction and theft of agricultural infrastructure, crippled Ukraine’s farming and export economy, dramatically drove up global grain prices, and outrageously deprived food-insecure recipients of much needed resources. Its attacks on a major food exporter produced similar shocks to global food prices. To detract focus from its brutal tactics, Russia continues to minimize the dislocations it has caused to global commodity markets and its inhumane deprivation of people in Ukraine and across the globe.

This lies in stark contrast with the efforts of the U.S. and others to aid Ukraine and developing countries around the world suffering from Putin’s actions. Foremost among these efforts are the Congressional commitments to provide Ukraine with budget support and economic assistance to keep critical government functions going. In addition, we are pushing international donors to accelerate their complementary bilateral support. We thank Congress for already granting $8.5 billion for Ukraine assistance that has gone toward these efforts.

The economic actions we have taken, both independently and jointly with our international partners, have had and will continue to have a significant effect on the Russian economy. Russia had been forced to impose draconian capital controls and is burning through its rainy-day fund, dramatically eroding its economic base and buffers in unsustainable ways. Russia will be in fiscal deficit by the end of this year. The IMF expects Russia’s economy will contract for at least the next two years, a sharp reversal from its 4.7 percent growth in 2021.2 Russia’s inflation rate after its invasion reached up to 21.3 percent, almost triple the rate from 2021, and remains in the double digits.3 The Russian stock market also reflects pessimism—its valuation remains depressed, sitting about 35 percent below pre-war levels.4 Further, the Central Bank Governor of Russia has started to advocate for “structural transformation.” 5 The bottom line is that Russia’s economic picture is bleak and deteriorating.

Significantly, these economic constraints are translating into real battlefield difficulties for Russia. The Russian Duma proposed wartime economic controls over the economy which would allow the state to commandeer private businesses as necessary and force employees of certain enterprises to work overtime.6 Struggling to import a host of industrial goods and technology, Russia has been forced to cannibalize its domestic industry to assemble battlefield hardware it can no longer buy from responsible countries. Russia has been forced to turn to outdated equipment and approach global pariahs like North Korea and Iran to source the tools to fight.

Fundamentally, the challenge we face in using financial measures to hold Russia accountable while mitigating the effects of the war on third countries is of a different kind than we face in other sanctions programs. Russia is not North Korea, Iran, or Venezuela. Moreover, Russia is a sizeable international economy, a globally important energy producer, and over the last 30 years has grown closely tied—and in some instances inextricably intertwined—with some of our closest international partners and allies. Imposing financial costs on Russia for its brutal policies while mitigating the consequences of Russia’s actions has required extraordinary planning, coordination, economic analysis and diplomacy, and creative policymaking, all alongside a large group of international partners.

In line with the 2021 Treasury Sanctions Review, we are constantly re-evaluating and reassessing our course of action. We ask ourselves: Do our policies achieve our intended goals? How has the target adapted to our measures? What adjustments do we need to make to increase our effectiveness and mitigate unintended consequences? How do we sustain and strengthen the international coalition of countries working together to hold President Putin accountable for his horrific war?

Examples of the real time adjustment Treasury has made to our financial policies include the multiple fact sheets we have issued just this year, including Preserving Agricultural Trade, Access to Communication, and Other Support to Those Impacted by Russia’s War Against Ukraine in April 2022 and the Food Security Fact Sheet published in July 2022, which both offer expansive information about how sanctions are calibrated to avoid unintended impacts as well as to counter Russian disinformation. These public guidance documents also clarify, in writing, to both industry and the international community that agricultural and medical products are not the targets of U.S. sanctions. Rather, any impediments to the delivery of these vital commodities lie squarely with Russia and its war, theft of food products, and shelling of agricultural sites, in addition to Russia’s own export restrictions on food and fertilizer.

We have also been keenly focused on Russia’s oil exports as we have implemented our evolving policy approach to deny Russia the money needed to sustain its war. At this point, these exports represent Russia’s primary source of hard currency. Moreover, Russia is reaping windfall profits from oil and petroleum products due to rising energy costs, spurred by the geopolitical uncertainty Russia caused by choosing to pursue a land war in Europe. We are concerned with the way energy revenues fuel Russia’s war efforts but the global nature of the oil market requires a careful approach.

Energy security affects us all—including American households that have seen rising prices at the pump and elsewhere as the downstream effects of rising energy costs have applied inflationary pressures across the economy. Elevated energy prices hit the poorest the hardest, in our country and across the world. Simply put, applying financial pressure to curb Russia’s windfall energy profits requires a different, creative approach to make sure that Russian coffers, not regular citizens in our economy and the rest of the world, bear the costs we impose. That challenge—and the need for a carefully tailored policy approach—is urgent. We cannot allow Russia to continue to fund its atrocities, and we must do all we can to prevent the recessionary risks that follow extended painful, unaffordable energy prices.

Our commitment to counter Russia’s energy war profiteering centers on our effort—alongside an international coalition, starting with the G7 countries—to impose a “price cap” on maritime Russian oil and product exports. Ultimately, the price cap policy is the most viable option to support the security and affordability of the global oil supply.

The oil price cap mechanism is a tool for other importers—mainly developing and emerging economies suffering most as a result of Putin’s war—to demand a lower price for Russian oil that they purchase. We are already seeing this take place with Russia negotiating steep discounts for the oil it sells to buyers in Asia. These discounts are already depriving Russia of revenues it would otherwise use to finance its reckless war.

As a technical matter, this policy creates a framework for companies in price-cap-coalition countries offering services for Russia’s maritime transport of oil: They can continue to offer these services for Russian oil priced below the cap, and may not for any Russian oil sold above that price. Given that premium service providers and the majority of providers of some maritime services—like insurance, payments, and trade finance—are located in G7 and EU countries, there is an overwhelming economic incentive for buyers to purchase under the price cap so they can engage these service providers. It will be cheaper and less risky to move Russian oil cargoes this way. We will continue to communicate closely with service providers, as we have already done in developing this framework, to collectively, constructively, and aggressively sustain participation in and the success of this policy.

But make no mistake: This is and will remain very hard work. This is an entirely new way to use financial measures against a global bully. A price cap coalition requires unprecedented coordination with international partners, as well as close partnership with global maritime industries, and exceptional resolve in the face of hostile Russian bluster and threats, including the risk that Russia may seek to retaliate. I can tell you confidently that we at Treasury—and our partners across the U.S. Government—are extraordinarily diligent when it comes to these economic policies and the commitment to extensive and creative multilateral engagement. Moreover, we are laser-focused on the imperative to hold Russia accountable and support the people of Ukraine, to constantly understand the risk environment, and to advance a foreign and financial policy that embodies our goals and does not bend to the rants and coercion of a brutal bully.

We know that Russia’s war in Ukraine is not the only challenge for which the Treasury Department will be called upon to act. Other threats demand our attention as well, and the illicit finance landscape continues to evolve. Additionally, while the U.S. dollar, U.S. financial institutions and services, and our capital markets are still dominant in international finance and trade, our adversaries are actively finding ways to attack this centrality and insulate themselves from touchpoints with the U.S. financial system. These are long-term challenges that we cannot sanction ourselves out of. We must continue to strengthen the U.S. financial system and innovate new ways to use economic policies and authorities to meet both our domestic and foreign policy objectives. The price cap—a bold policy never previously attempted by the U.S. Treasury—is the vanguard for a new form of economic statecraft, and I am proud to be a part of the team pushing these boundaries in the interest of U.S. national security.

Lastly, I’d like to echo Secretary Yellen and Deputy Secretary Adeyemo’s sentiments and my gratitude for the additional resources Congress has provided in the Ukraine supplemental appropriations packages. Your timely actions are what allow me and the dedicated career staff at Treasury to surge on this urgent national security priority. The partnership between Congress and the Administration has always been very important to U.S. policy toward Russia, sanctions, and responding to the crisis in Ukraine. I would be happy to answer your questions and look forward to working with you as we move forward. Thank you.


1 https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/02/24/remarks-by-president-biden-on-russias-unprovoked-and-unjustified-attack-on-ukraine/

2 https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2022/07/26/world-economic-outlook-update-july-2022

3 https://www.cbr.ru/eng/press/keypr/

4 Data from time series Moscow Stock Exchange Index available here: https://www.moex.com/

5 https://www.cbr.ru/eng/press/event/?id=14034

6 As reported by Russian media: https://tass.com/economy/1476563

OCC Allows National Banks and Federal Savings Associations Affected by Hurricane Ian in Florida to Close

News Release 2022-120 | September 27, 2022

WASHINGTON — The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) today issued a proclamation allowing national banks, federal savings associations, and federal branches and agencies of foreign banks to close offices in areas affected by Hurricane Ian in Florida.

In issuing the proclamation, the OCC expects that only those bank offices directly affected by potentially unsafe conditions will close. Those offices should make every effort to reopen as quickly as possible to address the banking needs of their customers.

OCC Bulletin 2012-28, “Supervisory Guidance on Natural Disasters and Other Emergency Conditions” (September 21, 2012), provides guidance on actions bankers could consider implementing when their bank or savings association operates or has customers in areas affected by a natural disaster or other emergency.

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